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"Why Infer"? What the New Institutional 
Economics Has to Say About 
Law-Supplied Default Rules 
J.P. Kostritsky· 
A central question of contract law remains: when should the law supply a term not 
expressly agreed to? Many scholars have addressed that question, yet the justification for law-
supplied terms often remains unconvincing. Because many proposals to supply terms do not 
incorporate a comparative framework for assessing the costs and benefits of legal interventions, 
they are incompletely justified. T11is A11icle proposes that a comparative net benefit approach 
(developed in institutional economics to explain private arrangements) be adapted and 
expanded to resolve fundamental issues of legal intervention. This Article uses that framework 
to critique the (1) hypothetical bargain and (2) Ayres/Gertner penalty defo.ult rule approaches to 
law-supplied terms. Finally, this Article illustrates the benefits of the comparative framework 
for resolving questions of law-supplied rules in the precontractual negotiation and 
subcontractor bidding contexts. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The great question confronting judges and legal scholars is, in the 
words of one of my colleagues, "Why infer?"1 When and why is it 
justifiable in contexts involvi_ng assent-based obligatio11..s2 for the law 
to supply a term or commitment to which the parties did not expressly 
agree?4 
The issue of justification for law-supplied terms and obligations 
is an important one. It underlies decisions as basic to law as: Should 
the law even provide a forum for a dispute?5 When should the law 
simply take a "hands off' attitude by refusing to supply terms, 6 and 
when should it intervene either through default rules7 or by supplying 
a term by implication? 
The question of legal intervention in assent-based relations 
crosses varied subject areas. Although these diverse areas often focus 
1. See Conversations with Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law, and Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law in Cleveland, Ohio (1997). 
2. Law-supplied assent-based obligations are meant to refer to legal interventions 
which follow negotiations between the parties even in cases where the negotiations did not 
result in the inclusion of a term which the law now proposes to include. Assent-based 
obligations are distinguishable from tort obligations imposed without "communication 
between the parties." E-mail from Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law, to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law (Apr. 5, 1997) (on file with author) [hereinafter Coffey E-
mail (Apr. 5, 1997)]. 
3. Supplying a commitment could take the form of a liability rule. 
4. Contracts scholars have addressed this question in the context of filling gaps in 
incomplete contracts. Often the law-supplied commitment or obligation takes the form of a 
default rule out of which parties may opt. Default rules are distinguishable from an 
immutable rule "that parties cannot contractually abrogate." Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, 
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 
87, 88 (1989). 
5. Sometimes courts refuse to provide a judicial forum for a dispute and in so doing 
decline to intervene. They refuse a judicial forum to illegal contracts to deter such 
transactions. See Juliet P. Kostritsky, fllegal Contracts and Efficient Deterrence: A Study in 
Modem Contract Theory, 74 IOWAL. REv. 115, 118-19 (1988). 
6. The traditional justification for the courts' refusal to supply terms is that to do so 
would promote inefficiency. Had the terms been optimal, they would have been reflected in 
the contract, absent transaction costs. The failure to include the terms must reflect the 
parties' belief that the term was not optimal and should not be included. See Richard 
Craswell, Freedom of Contract, The Coase Lecture 3 (Univ. of Chicago Law & Econ. 
Working Paper No. 33, 1994) [hereinafter Craswell, Coase Lecture]; R.H. Coase, The 
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & EcoN. I, 8 (1960) (describing tendency of parties to 
reach optimal result regardless of assignment of initial liability rule). 
7. Professor Williamson alludes to the connection between institutional economics 
and gap filling when he states: "The study of structures that facilitate gapfilling, dispute 
settlement, adaptation, and the like thus become part of the problem of economic 
organization." OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 56 ( 1996) 
[hereinafter WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE). 
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on individual doctrinal issues, the real issue, which often remains 
hidden, is one of justifYing the legal intervention itsel£ The court must 
confront the question of whether the law should supply a term or 
obligation to which the parties have not expressly agreed. It must do 
this whether it grapples with (1) why and in what circumstances the 
law should supply a fiduciary "performance obligation" in the 
principal/agent context,8 (2) why and when the law should supply a 
term of irrevocability in section 45 option contracts9 or in 
subcontractor bidding cases, 10 or (3) why the law should imply a 
commitment in precontractual section 90 contexts.1 1 
Despite the centrality of the question of law-supplied obligation, 
the means of resolution remain elusive. The contractual default rule 
literature relied on to resolve the appropriateness of a variety of law-
supplied terms is flawed. 12 The literature often fails to utilize a 
framework with realistic behavioral assumptions that can fully resolve 
whether a legal intervention is justified. In addition, this literature 
confuses situations that are fundamentally different in terms of the 
nature of legal intervention involved and subjects them to a unified 
default rule analysis. Such literature confuses cases in which a court 
8. See Ronald J. Coffey, Firm Opportunities: Property Right Assignments, Firm 
Detriment, and the Agents Performance Obligation, 13 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 155, 156 (1988) 
(discussing the connection between the fomml economic models of principal/agent relations 
and the Jaw-supplied or statutorily created fiduciary duty). 
9. See Richard Craswell, Offer. Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN L. REv. 
481, 526-31 (1996) [hereinafter Craswell, Efficient Reliance]; Juliet P. Kostritsky, Bargaining 
with Unce11ainty, Moral Hazard and Sunk Costs: A Default Rule for Precontractual 
Negotiations, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 621, 624 n.4 (1993) [hereinafter Kostritsky, Bargaining with 
Uncertainty] (suggesting framework for deciding whether law should supply a term of 
irrevocability in option contracts); see also infra text accompanying notes 198-211. 
I 0. See Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of Promissory 
Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249, 1267-81 (1996). Katz discusses 
"whether treating early offers as binding options solves the problem of opportunism" in 
subcontractor bidding cases. Id. at 1280; see also Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, 
supra note 9, at 690-92 (discussing precontractual commitment in subcontracting context). 
11. See Randy E. Barnett & Mary E. Becker, Beyond Reliance: Promissory 
Estoppel, Contract Formalities, and Misrepresentations, 15 HOFSTRA L. REv. 443 (1987); 
Randy E. Barnett, The Death of Reliance, 46 J. LEGAL Eouc. 518 (1996); Craswell, Efficient 
Reliance, supra note 9, at 536-40; Daniel A. Farber and John H. Matheson, Beyond 
Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake", 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 903 
(1985); E. Allan Farnsworth, Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements:· Fair 
Dealing and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 217 (1987); Mark P. Gergen, Liability 
for Mistake in Contract Formation, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1990); Katz, supra note 10; Juliet 
P. Kostritsky, Reshaping the Precontractual Liability Debate: Beyond Shorl Run Economics, 
58 U. Pm. L. REv. 325 (1997) [hereinafter Kostritsky, Precontractual Liability]; Edward 
Yorio & Steve The!, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 Y ALEL.J. Ill (1991). 
12. These law-supplied terms are also referred to as gap-fillers. See, e.g., Richard E. 
Speidel, Restatement Second: Omitted Terms and Contract Method, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 
785 (1982). 
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"supplies terms in addition to or other than what the parties have 
expressly bargained for" with cases in which the legal decisionmaker 
refuses to add or subtract terms from the express bargain. 13 This 
confusion diverts commentators from clearly identifying a :framework 
to justify legal intervention in the form of an implied term. 
Second, because authors often focus on the substance of a 
particular default rule without a recognition that the default rule is law-
supplied and therefore must be justified, 14 they attempt to resolve 
questions of implied obligation without reference to a well developed 
comparative benefit methodology that is standard in new institutional 
economics.15 A comparative benefit methodology compares the costs 
and benefits of the proposed scheme with various other strategies for 
achieving common goals. 16 Such goals include maximizing the 
surplus from trade17 by controlling problems such as opportunism.18 
13. E-mail from Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law, to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law (May 23, 1996) (on file with author). Such approaches constitute a 
"default in the form of a refusal to engage in implication." !d. 
14. For a discussion of the Hadley default rule, see infra notes 124-125 and 
accompanying text. Professors Ayres and C'ertner discuss the Hadley rule and its possible 
benefits. This rule could force disclosure of a party who would otherwise withhold 
information that might be socially useful. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 103-04. But 
they fail to focus on the Hadley rule as a law-supplied default rule which must be justified on 
a comparative basis. See infra text accompanying notes 160-183. 
15. "New Institutional Economics (1) holds that institutions matter and are 
susceptible to analysis, (2) is different from but not hostile to orthodoxy, and (3) is an 
interdisciplinary combination of law, economics and organization .... " WILLIAMSON, 
MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 7, at 3 (citation omitted); see also Edward L. 
Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of 
Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1393, 1413-16 (1996) (discussing new institutional 
economics). 
Institutional economics focuses on "differential transaction costs," and contends that the 
effort to minimize transaction costs explains a variety of institutional choices. WILLIAMSON, 
MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 7, at 5. It views the control of opportunistic 
behavior and moral hazard as a core problem. See id. at 5. It uses a set of realistic behavio<al 
assumptions to assess whether governance solutions to the hazard control problem are cost-
effective. Most importantly, institutional economics urges a methodology or 
"remediableness" to assess and compare alternative approaches to solve problems and 
maximize trade surplus. See id. at 7. 
16. Professor Williamson developed this comparative methodology in his 
remediableness approach. "The relevant criterion is thus that ofremediableness, according to 
which an outcome for which no superior alternative can be described and implemented with 
net gains is presumed to be efficient." !d. 
17. "If we assume rationality, then it follows that, regardless of the risk attitudes of 
particular parties, the dominant strategy for contractual risk allocation is to maximize the 
expected value of the contract for both parties." Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of 
Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597, 602 (1990). 
18. Controlling opportunism in a cost-effective way is important "lest ... gains be 
dissipated by costly subgoal pursuit." OLIVER E. WILLlAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 
OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 63 (1985) [hereinafter, 
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Proposed default rules which lack a comparison of "feasible superior 
alternative[ s ]"remain incompletely justi:fied.19 
Third, even when the default rule literature incorporates realistic 
behavioral assumptions affecting the bargaining process, such as 
strategic behavior/0 it fails to incorporate these assumptions into a 
modef1 that can ultimately justify the conclusion that the benefits and 
costs of legal intervention outweigh the benefits and costs of other 
approaches the parties might use to achieve common goals, given the 
barriers to private contract solutions.Z2 While recognizing that 
strategizing may cause inefficiencies/3 default mle scholars do not 
explain fully why the presence of such inefficiencies cannot be solved 
by other cost-effective private methods which do not involve a law-
supplied rule.Z4 Nor do such authors explain how the presence of 
strategizing in conjunction with asset specificity25 and bounded 
rationalitY6 may cause inefficiencies which cannot be readily solved 
WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS]. "Because hazards are priced out, it is in the firm's 
interest to provide safeguards in cost-effective degree." Oliver E. Williamson & Janet 
Bercovitz, The Modern Corporation as an Efficiency Instrument: The Comparative 
Contracting Perspective, in THE .A..JI.ill!'JCAN CORI'OMTION TODAY 327, 339 (Carl Kaysen ed., 
1996) [hereinafter Williamson & Bercovitz, The Modem Corporation]. Doing so will 
presumably maximize the surplus available. "[T]he mitigation of hazards can be the source 
of mutual gain." WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 7, at 60. 
19. Williamson & Bercovitz, The Modem C01poration, supra note 18, at 333 
(citation omitted). "The qualified version of the remediableness standard thus reduces to the 
following: except as rebutted by exceptions of the kinds referred to earlier and elaborated 
elsewhere outcomes for which no feasible superior alternative can be described and 
implemented with net gains are presumed to be efficient." !d. (citation omitted); see also 
WILLIAMSON, MECHANJSMS OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 7, at 7. 
20. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 100 (discussing the tendency of a 
party to act strategically by attempting to hide deficiencies in order to get a "cross-subsidized 
price"). 
21. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 18, at 67. 
22. See id. 
23. Ayres and Gertner posit that strategizing will cause the high-cost miller to 
conceal his type if there is no incentive in the legal rule to disclose his type, thus causing 
inefficiencies to occur when the shipper fails to take cost-effective precautions. See Ayres & 
Gertner, supra note 4, at 101. 
24. Thus, while Ayres and Gertner addressed the loss in value caused by strategizing 
by parties concealing their types, they did not consider whether private strategies, such as 
screening for type, could solve the losses in a more cost-effective manner. 
25. Asset specificity refers to investments that take the form of sunk costs, which 
"are specifically tailored to the transaction and cannot be fully salvaged outside the 
transaction." G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation of Commercial 
Contracts: Toward a New Cause of Action, 44 VAND. L. REv. 221, 229 (1991). 
26. Bounded rationality "is a semistrong form of rationality in which economic 
actors are assumed to be 'intendedly rational, but only limitedly so."' WILLIAMSON, 
ECONOMIC INSTJTIITIONS, supra note 18, at 45 (quoting HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINJSTRATIVE 
BEHAVIOR at xxiv (2d ed. 1961 )). 
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by express contracting.27 Moreover, they fail to devise a structure for 
determining how opportunistic hazards from strategizing can be 
mitigated to maximize joint gains from trade in the most cost-effective 
manner with the greatest net benefits. Thus they fail to invoke a well-
known comparative methodology8 for exploring and comparing a 
range of possible feasible solutions for persistent problems of 
uncertainty and sunk costs when express private contract solutions to 
rent-seeking behavior will be difficult or unattainable.Z9 Without that 
methodology, the literature cannot explain why law-supplied default 
rules should be preferred over other approaches. 
Finally, while the body of literature on transaction cost 
economics and the new institutional economics remains a potentially 
rich source of solutions to the problem of justifying an implied 
obligation, it remains partially inaccessible to the current students of 
contract default rules. This Article will offer a framework to guide 
decisionmakers in determining the appropriateness ( efficiency)30 of 
law-supplied implied obligations,31 by highlighting the realistic 
behavioral assumptions32 of transaction cost methodology as it is 
27. See id. at 67. 
28. See Williamson & Bercovitz, The Modem Corporation, supra note 18, at 332-33 
(discussing the characteristics of a comparative "remediableness" methodology). 
29. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC lNSTITIJTIONS, supra note 18, at 67; see also 
William J. Baumol, Williamson s The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, 17 RAND J. EcoN. 
279, 280 (1986). Baumol noted: 
Williamson lists three necessary conditions that, in the absence of externalities, 
make it likely (if they are all satisfied) that efficiency problems will not 
automatically solve themselves optimally through a marriage of the market 
mechanism and contractual relationships. These three requirements ... are asset 
specificity (sunk costs), ... "bounded rationality," ... and ... "opportunism." 
Baumol, supra, at 280. 
30. This Article is concerned with promoting and analyzing efficiency in private 
arrangements. "Theories of fair exchange" provide an alternative mode of interpreting 
contracts and filling in gaps. David Chamy, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative 
Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REv. 1815, 1839 (1991). 
31. New institutional transaction costs economics is not concerned with law-supplied 
rules per se. Instead it "works out of a private ordering rather than legal centralism approach 
to contract law." WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 7, at 42. Despite 
the reorientation of new institutional economics toward private ordering and away from law, 
this Article concludes that the new institutional economics can and should address questions 
of legal intervention, using the same framework developed to explain choices in private 
ordering. 
32. Of crucial import is the view of transaction cost economics that "behavioral 
assumptions are important." !d. at 55. The emphasis on realistic behavioral assumptions, 
with its recognition of such traits as bounded rationality, sunk costs, and moral hazard, must 
be part of any effort to understand man and his institutions, including legal ones. See 
WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC lNSTITIJTIONS, supra note 18, at 44. Coase began this trend toward 
a realistic assessment of behavioral assumptions with his frank recognition of the presence of 
transaction costs. See Coase, supra note 6, at 16 (calling attention to the costs of market 
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reflected in new institutional economics, emphasizing the "hazard 
mitigation,"33 and comparing and assessing the arrangements to 
determine which will yield the greatest net bene:fits.34 
Part II of this Article seeks to remedy defects in current 
approaches to law-supplied obligation by presenting a methodology 
derived from the new institutional economics that can be used to 
justify law-supplied obligations in a second-best world.35 It adopts a 
"framework" comparing "alternative feasible forms . . . with each 
other"36 to determine whether the implementation of any law-supplied 
rule would be efficient in the sense of increasing net gains. In its 
current formulation, the comparative institutional approach is used 
primarily to explain why parties have adopted various organizational 
structures and thus to explain what actually exists.37 Tills Article 
suggests that the comparative net benefit approach of the new 
institutional economics should be extended to cases where the parties 
themselves have failed to adopt a term or resolve a matter by contract, 
and a legal decisionmaker must determine whether supplying terms or 
liability rules would maximize the joint gains from trade.38 Law, 
transactions and their effects in hindering the "optimal arrangement of rights"). Oliver 
Williamson has heeded the Coasian injunction to formulate realistic behavioral assumptions. 
See Oliver E. Williamson, Revisiting Legal Realism: 17ze Law, Economics, and Organization 
Perspective, 5 INDus. & CoRP. CHANGE 383, 388 (1996) [hereinafter Williamson, Revisiting 
Legal Realism] (explaining the Co asian approach of studying "[t]he process of contracting in 
a real-world setting" (quoting Coase)). Hazard mitigation figures prominently in the 
literature of new institutional economics. See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS OF 
GOVERNANCE, supra note 7, at 5 (explaining how "the study of governance is concerned with 
the identification, explication, and mitigation of all forms of contractual hazards.") 
33. Williamson & Bercovitz, The Modem Corporation, supra note 18, at 332. 
34. See id. (discussing principle of comparing "alternative feasible forms" and 
rejecting approach based on comparing "feasible forms ... in relation to a hypothetical 
ideal'). 
35. Second-best refers to an imperfect world in which we cannot reach the first-best 
world which has no transaction costs. Second-best does not refer to the theory of second-best 
in which an "action that is proposed cannot be evaluated until we see whether unintended 
consequences make us worse off." Memorandum from Peter M. Gerhart, Professor of Law, 
Case Western Reserve University School of Law (Jan. 30, 1998) (on file with author). 
36. Williamson & Bercovitz, The Modem Corporation, supra note 18, at 332 
(emphasis omitted). 
37. For this reason, as Oliver Williamson explains, "[s]ome might object that the 
remediableness standard exchanges utopian reasoning for Dr. Pangloss, and it is certainly true 
that the remediableness standards is more deferential to 'what is."' !d. at 332-33. 
38. Williamson explains that such maximization can occur through control of 
opportunism. "Harmonizing the contractual interface that joins the parties, thereby to effect 
adaptability and promote continuity, becomes the source of real economic value." 
WILLIAMSON, EcoNOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note I 8, at 30. 
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Economics, and Organization theorj9 should set the stage for a new 
approach to incomplete contracting. 
Part III of the Article will examine and critique the Clli""Tent 
hypothetical bargain default rule literature. At present, it has failed to 
develop a comparative methodology to justify the presence of a law-
supplied obligation. This Part will also suggest that the deficiencies in 
current theories of default rules, including hypothetical bargain theory, 
must be modified to include a comparative net benefit standard in 
order to provide a complete structure for determining what the parties 
would want. 
Part N will draw on the comparative analysis developed in the 
first two Parts of this Article to critique the penalty default rule 
methodology proposed by Ayres and Gertner.40 This Part suggests that 
while the penalty default rule methodology helpfully recognizes the 
importance of strategic behavior in deciding how to craft default rules, 
it still fails to provide a complete justification for a law-supplied rule 
because it fails to provide a means of detennining whether a suggested 
law-supplied rule will achieve greater net benefits than other 
approaches in a second-best world.41 Moreover, because Ayres and 
Gertner fail to distinguish between default rules that supply terms and 
those that refuse to do so,42 they fail to provide an explanatory theory 
which can account for the variegated judicial approaches to contractual 
gaps. 
Ayres and Gertner's penalty default rule analysis cannot explain 
the full range of approaches taken to basic issues of gap filling. They 
argue that the courts' refusal to fill quantity terms left incomplete 
stems from an underlying penalty default rule designed to force the 
parties to reveal information about the quantity ex ante, because doing 
so will efficiently save the courts the cost of filling in such quantity ex 
post.43 However, the penalty default rule does not explain the very 
different approaches taken to quantity terms in short- and long-term 
contracts. In long-term contracts the courts are often willing to permit 
the enforcement of requirements contracts44 in which the actual 
quantity is not specified. In such cases, courts recognize that 
39. Law, Economics, and Organization theory is discussed in Williamson, Revisiting 
Legal Realism, supra note 32. 
40. See generally Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4. 
4 I. See infra note 54 (discussing meaning of second-best to refer to an imperfect 
world). 
42. See supra text accompanying notes 12-13. 
43. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 96 (explaining that "it is systematically 
harder for the courts to figure out the quantity than the price ex post"). 
44. See U.C.C. § 2-306 (1995). 
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persuasive barriers, such as the unforeseeability of the future, may 
prevent the achievement of ex ante specificity and permit the 
enforcement of what would otherwise be considered indefinite 
contracts. 45 
Part IV of the Article also challenges the Ayres and Gertner 
attack on the "soundness" of the hypothetical bargain rationale. This 
Article argues that the discrediting of the majoritarian hypothetical 
bargain depends on a falsely perceived judicial rejection of majority 
preferences. The results in these types of cases are better explained by 
the law's disinclination to intervene to implement majority preferences 
if no barriers prevent the private achievement of such goals. So 
conceptualized, the cases are still consistent with a hypothetical 
bargain rationale.46 
The presence of an underlying hypothetical bargain rationale in 
these cases has been obscured by the failure of the legal decisionmaker 
to employ a realistic model of behavioral assumptions and a 
comparative approach. These failures have hampered the 
development of a fra...tnev~'ork for justi~f.u"tJ.g legal intervTentiorm. Vlit"'l 
such a framework, courts could then determine whether a legal 
intervention is efficient in the sense that "some selected objective ... 
will be achieved at a higher level with the inteljection (intervention) 
than without it, all things (benefits achieved and costs incurred, with 
the intervention as compared without the intervention) considered,"47 
and is therefore hypothetically preferred. Under this suggested 
structure one can rationalize rules, such as the Hadley rule in 
hypothetical bargain terms, although Ayres and Gertner have viewed 
such rules as antimajoritarian, penalty default terms. 
Part V will look at particular instances of law-supplied default 
rules in precontractual negotiation. It will illuminate the underlying 
frameworks and assumptions used to justify legal interventions in the 
form of suggested law-supplied liability rules or terms. This Part 
45. See infra notes 172-183 and accompanying text. 
46. Hypothetical bargain methodology underlies much of current default rule 
scholarship. One recent scholar (and critic) explains the approach as follows: "To interpret 
contracts, lawyers ask: what would the parties have agreed to had they explicitly adverted to 
the issue? That is, the interpreter constructs a 'hypothetical bargain': he determines how the 
parties would have bargained to treat the situation that has arisen had it been directly 
presented to them .... " Chamy, supra note 30, at 1815-16. For a discussion of how the 
Hadley case can be rationalized under a reformulated hypothetical bargain standard see infra 
notes 176-183 and accompanying text. 
47. E-mail from Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law, to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law (July 16, 1996) (on file with author) [hereinafter Coffey E-mail 
(July 16, 1996)]. 
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suggests that current justifications for the particular default rules for 
precontractual negotiation are flawed because they (1) fail to identifY 
relevant structural features necessary to resolve whether a given law-
supplied rule will produce "a greater net benefit" and is therefore more 
efficient than other altematives,48 (2) obscure the law-supplied nature 
of the default rule, and (3) fail to develop a comparative framework. 
Those analytical flaws are fundamental. They hamper the efforts 
of commentators to (1) justifY liability rules which they propose,49 
(2) explain the variability in judicial treatment of vague or incomplete 
contracts,50 or (3) explain whether and in what circumstances the law 
should intervene. 51 
Part VI will use Williamsonian economics and the analytical 
framework developed in this Article to resolve questions about the 
nature and scope of law-supplied obligations in subcontracting. This 
Part will suggest that current approaches fail to grasp the behavioral 
realities of subcontractor bargaining, obscure the law-supplied nature 
of the implied terms, fail to provide a comparative analytical structure 
for resolving whether the law should inteiject an implied term, and 
therefore reach inappropriate conciusions on when the contractor's 
reliance should be protected. 52 
II. THE FRAMEWORK: THE "COMPARATIVE NET BENEFIT" 
STANDARD 
In · determining whether the law should intervene through a 
"rearrangement of [legal] rights"53 and supply terms or a liability rule 
not expressly agreed to, one must first determine whether we are in an 
ideal or a second-best world.54 In a first-best frictionless world, the 
48. See E-mail from Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law, to Juliet P. Kostritsky, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law (July 11, 1995). 
49. See infra Parts IV and V. 
50. See infra text accompanying notes 172-183 
51. See infra text accompanying notes 1 72-183. 
52. See infra Part VI. 
53. Coase, supra note 6, at 15. 
54. By "second-best" this Article is not referring to the theory of second-best 
pioneered by Lipsey and Lancaster. It instead refers to an imperfect world in which 
persuasive barriers interfere with the achievement of a first-best contract achievable, by 
defmition, only if such barriers did not exist. The Article rejects the nihilistic view of Lipsey 
and Lancaster that the acknowledgement of imperfections and the absence of a frrst-best 
world means that we cannot identify a hypothetically preferred bargain "because the 
functions of imperfections cannot be sufficiently specified to optimize the interdependence 
among them, and therefore the extent to which express or law-supplied terms can address 
them is hopelessly indeterminate." Coffey E-mail (Apr. 5, 1997), supra note 2. For a study 
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parties themselves can be expected to achieve completely contingent 
contracts that maximize gains from trade and improve joint welfare.55 
In such a world, "the only thing then left to bargain over would be who 
gets what gain from trade,"56 a matter about which contract law would 
presumably remain indifferent. 57 The parties could be expected to 
rearrange ''the initial legal delimitation of rights ... if it would lead to 
an increase in the value ofproduction."58 Without frictions the parties 
themselves could rearrange their rights and the "ultimate result (which 
maximises [sic] the value of production) is independent of the legal 
position if the pricing system is assumed to work without cost. "59 
Legal intervention would presumably be unnecessary.in such a world. 
Because natural barriers beset the parties, however, a frictionless 
world does not exist. A second-best world of positive transaction costs 
including bounded rationality, asset specificity, and opportunism 
exists60 and parties may therefore fail to achieve contracts that achieve 
the parties' assumed shared objectives.61 The confluence of these 
characteristics presents "serious contractual difficulties" for the 
parties. 62 In this imperfect world, the legal decisionmaker must 
determine whether and in what circumstances the law should supply a 
term, given the inability of the contracting parties to achieve a first-
best arrangement. The governing principle for judging the efficiency 
of legal interventions should be a comparative one. That 
determination would necessarily include a consideration of "the law 
and economics of private ordering."63 
of the theory of second-best, see R.G. Lipsey and K. Lancaster, The General Theory of 
Second Best, 24 REv. EcoN. STUD. II (1956-1957). 
55. See Coase, supra note 6, at 8. In such a frictionless world "[t]he moral of the 
story is that if the market is working perfectly, there should never be any inefficient contract 
terms, so efficiency can never be improved by forbidding certain terms." Craswell, Coase 
Lecture, supra note 6, at 3. 
56. Coffey E-mail (July 16, 1996), supra note 47. 
57. Ordinarily distributional effects are not central to efficiency analyses of legal 
rules. See, e.g., Richard Craswell, The Relational Move: Some Questions from Law and 
Economics, 3 S. CAL. lNTERDISC. L.J. 91, 100 (1993) (contrasting ordinary efficiency 
analysis with distributional effects analysis). 
58. Coase, supra note 6, at 15. 
59. !d. at 8. 
60. Williamson discusses the importance of these behavioral assumptions in 
transaction cost economics. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC lNSTITUI10NS, supra note 18, at 
44-54. 
61. Common objectives include the maximization of the "expected value of the 
contract for both parties. Only by allocating risks in order to maximize the joint expected 
benefits from their contractual relationship can the parties hope to maximize their individual 
utility." Scott, supra note 17, at 602. 
62. WILLIAMSON, EcONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 18, at 67. 
63. !d. at 21. 
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To date, the "remediableness" or comparative net benefit 
standard has been used by transaction cost economists to explain that 
the parties choose organizational structures and institutions to 
minimize transaction costs. 64 In some instances, minimizing 
transaction costs causes corporations to vertically integrate; "interfirm 
contracting may be supplanted by internal organization. Markets give 
way to hierarchies."65 Corporate decisions (such as whether to seek 
vertical integration or engage in market contracting) can thus be 
explained by a desire to minimize hazards of opportunism in the most 
cost-effective ways.66 
The principle of remediableness requiring a comparative 
assessment of net benefits has thus been used to explain a variety of 
other organizational choices made by firms. Williamson has used a 
comparative analysis of net benefits to explain "three struchrral 
features . . . : perpetuity, autonomous contracting, and linuted 
liability," characteristic of corporations.67 He argues that those 
organizational modes are tmdertaken precisely because they solve 
certain hazards at a lesser cost than a range of alternatives. 68 In other 
instances, transaction costs may explain the presence of "contractual 
safeguards [which] will be introduced in the degree to which that is 
cost-effective."69 These "include talce-or-pay clauses, penalty clauses, 
reciprocal trading arrangements, and special information disclosure 
and dispute-settling arrangements, of which arbitration is an 
example."70 
While the usefulness of the comparative assessment principle has 
been evident as a means of explaining what exists (such as an 
organizational structure actually undertaken), there has been a failure 
to extend its stmcture beyond a rationalization of what exists to 
include a determination of whether or when certain law-supplied mles 
should be adopted to supplement private arrangements. 
64. "The discriminating alignment hypothesis to which transaction-cost economics 
owes much of its predictive content holds that transactions, which differ in their attributes, 
are aligned with governance structures, which differ in their costs and competencies, in a 
discriminating (mainly, transaction-cost-economizing) way." WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS OF 
GOVERNANCE, supra note 7, at 101. 
65. Williamson & Bercovitz, The Modern Corporation, supra note 18, at 341. 
66. "The monopoly approaches ascribe departures from the classical norm to 
monopoly purpose. The efficiency approaches hold that the departures serve economizing 
purposes instead." WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 18, at 23. 
67. Williamson & Bercovitz, The Modern Corporation, supra note 18, at 334. 
68. See id. at 337. 
69. !d. at 344. 
70. ld. at 341. 
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This Article suggests that the remediableness net benefit 
comparison should be adapted to determine if and in what cases law-
supplied terms with what content would be appropriate. Under this 
approach, if law-supplied terms would "move the parties closer to 
what they wanted (in a narrow sense of economic welfare 
improvement), minimizing the dead weight costs imposed by the 
natural barriers (uncertainty, opportunism, and sunk costs) and thereby 
increasing the gain from exchange,"71 than other alternatives, then a 
legal intervention in the form of a default rule of implication is 
appropriate. 
Of course, the parties may use private devices or express 
contracts to achieve their assumed welfare improvement goals. 72 To 
determine whether a law-supplied rule will enhance joint welfare in 
the above described sense, 73 the legal decisionmaker must first 
determine whether the parties themselves can overcome the barriers to 
maximizing the gain from exchange and if so, at what cost. Only after 
determining that the law-supplied rule will maximize gains from trade 
(and sumlus) bv overcoming: barriers at a cheaner cost than the narties' 
" .1 / "" ..... ... ... 
private counterstrategies (thereby achieving greater net benefits) 
should the legal decisionmaker determine that a particular law-
supplied rule would be preferred on a cost/benefit basis.74 
III. DEFAULT RULE METHODOLOGY: THE .ABSENCE OF A 
COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY 
The failure to grasp the relevance of the tmderlying comparative 
benefit structure for justifying law-supplied interventions has obscured 
current scholarly efforts to guide courts filling gaps in incomplete 
contracts. It has led to the hypothetical bargain, a suggested method 
71. Coffey E-mail (July 16, 1996), supra note 47. 
72. These private counterstrategies can take many different forms. In the agency . 
context, the parties face the same bounded rationality problems, as well as problems of 
opportunism, which confront parties negotiating many types of contracts. Because of 
bounded rationality problems, principals would have difficulty devising an express fully 
contingent contract which could specify in advance ali of the choices that an agent might face 
and devise specific contracts to control shirking. Consequently, the principal may employ a 
series of other counterstrategies including monitoring, bonding, screening and ex ante 
alignment schemes. See Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, supra note 9, at 654-57. 
73. See supra text accompanying note 7 I . 
74. See Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, supra note 9, at 651 ("This Article 
addresses whether the law should supply a default rule by conducting a further analysis-
comparing the costs of possible private mechanisms for overcoming the barriers to 
contracting with those of a law-supplied rule."). 
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for filling in contractual gaps. 75 In its current form, the hypothetical 
bargain fails to justifY the default rules proposed under its aegis, 
because the theory on which it is based ignores the comparative 
framework, which is central to justifYing legal interventions, in a 
number of ways. 
First, some proponents of the hypothetical bargain seem to 
assume incorrectly that the parties would have bargained to include an 
express contract term, and thereby neglect the importance of other 
types of "private orderings," highlighted by Oliver Williamson and 
others. 76 Second, because they are premised on rules for a frictionless 
world, hypothetical bargain rationales ignore the realistic behavioral 
assumptions that are central to transaction cost analysis and new 
institutional economics. Thus, they cannot provide solutions designed 
for a second-best world in which persuasive barriers interfere with the 
achievement of private contractual solutions. Third, the hypothetical 
bargain rationales sometimes assume incorrectly that transaction costs 
constitute the main or only barrier to private solutions, thereby 
neglecting the full range of other barriers that interfere with private 
solutions.77 Finally, the hypothetical bargain rationales tend to neglect 
the importance of a comparative assessment, central to a 
Williamsonian remediableness analysis. Without that comparative 
element, hypothetical bargain theory cannot determine whether a law-
supplied rule would be preferred to other strategies, including "private 
orderings" undertaken by the parties. 
In its traditional formulation, the hypothetical bargain purports to 
justifY particular instances of law-supplied terms, by reference to a 
projected hypothetical bargain. The law acts as a "facilitator[], 
specifYing terms that the parties could formulate themselves if 
unrestrained by time and effort costs."18 A similar formulation 
provides that: "[ o ]n these simple assumptions, transactors would not 
75. Hypothetical bargain methodology including "fundamental issues of method and 
justification" are discussed generally in Chamy, supra note 30. For a discussion of 
hypothetical bargain methodology, see supra note 46. 
76. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Governance: Framework and 
Implications, in ECONOMICS AS A PROCESS: ESSAYS IN THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 
171, 171 (Richard N. Langlois ed., 1986). 
77. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text. 
78. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis 
of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REv. 261, 266 
(1985) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Goetz & Scott, Expanded Choices]; see also Douglas 
G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 
V AND. L. REv. 829, 835-36 (1985) (embracing default rules that "provide all the parties with 
the type of contracts that they would have agreed to if they had had the time and money to 
bargain over all aspects of their deal"). 
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have to write down any terms at all. Transactors would lrnow that the 
law enforces whatever terms the transactors would specify; 
consequently, transactors need not actually incur these costs to get the 
benefits of the term."79 The role of the court in supplying default rules 
under hypothetical bargain theory is to minimize transaction costs for 
the parties by supplying a set of preformulated terms mimicking 
"arrangements ... most bargainers prefer."80 Idiosyncratic parties can 
easily opt out of these law-supplied default rules. 81 
One major difficulty with the prior formulations of hypothetical 
bargain default rules is that they suggest that the courts should supply 
terms which the parties would have agreed on had the circumstances 
been brought to their attention and had the parties had adequate time to 
negotiate a relevant contract provision. Many of these formulations of 
default rule methodology seem to assume, at least implicitly, that the 
court ought to fill in gaps with what the parties would have bargained 
to. These formulations apparently assume that there is a contractual 
provision to which the parties would have bargained given sufficient 
time. As Easterbrook and Fischel explain, "[ c ]orporate law-and in 
particular the fiduciary principle enforced by cou..rts---fills i.t1 the 
blanks and oversights with the terms that people would have bargained 
for had they anticipated the problems and been able to transact 
costlessly in advance."82 The formulation suggests the adoption of 
default rules with the contract provisions that the parties would have 
ultimately adopted, if they had the time and foresight to negotiate. 
The hypothetical bargain approach seems flawed because it does 
not appear to admit that the parties might have opted for other 
solutions, given the barriers to express contractual solutions. Had an 
issue been directly presented to them, the parties might well have 
chosen not to adopt a contractual solution at all but rather to opt for a 
noncontractual private solution.83 Thus, at least some hypothetical 
79. Chamy, supra note 30, at 1840. 
80. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General 
Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REv. 967, 971 (1983) (emphasis omitted) 
[hereinafter Goetz & Scott, Mitigation Principle]. There is some debate about the "extent to 
which the adjudicator [should] particularizeD her formulation to the particular transactors 
whose dispute is before her-adjusting the formulation for particular transactors' judgments, 
preferences, perceptions and so forth." Chamy, supra note 30, at 1820. 
81. They can opt out because default rules are not immutable. See Ayres & Gertner, 
supra note 4, at 89 (contrasting default rules with immutable rules). 
82. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. 
REv. 1416, 1444-45 (1989). 
83. These private solutions figure prominently in new institutional economics which 
has placed an emphasis on "private ordering through ex post governance." Wn.LIAMSON, 
MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 7, at I 0 (emphasis added). Of course, there is still 
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bargain approaches to gap filling incorrectly assume that the parties 
would have bargained to an express contract term, and neglect to 
advert expressly to noncontractual private solutions. These 
approaches downplay the importance of noncontractual alternatives 
which should be considered as part of a comparative institutional 
assessment. 
In addition, because some formulations attempt to derive 
hypothetically preferred terms by positing terms which the parties 
would have bargained toward in a frictionless world, they cannot 
provide solutions for a world in which frictions do exist in the form of 
uncertainty, opportunism, and sunk costs. 84 In that frictionless 
scenario, "[t]he only thing left to 'bargain' over would be who gets 
what portion of the total gain from trade."85 Because a frictionless 
world is unattainable, and a second-best world of frictions inevitably 
exists, it is important to recognize the frictions that parties face and to 
assess default rules in terms of their abilitv "to solve the ba..'Tiers 
problems that the parties would want, given a ~econd-best world."86 
Even hypothetical bargain formulations which recognize that 
some frictions exist are flawed because they seem to assume 
(incorrectly) that a particular barrier-that of boimded rationality-
constitutes the only barrier to the parties adopting a contractual term. 
If, however, the transaction costs ofbounded rationality constituted the 
parties' only obstacle, then, as Professor Williamson argues, the parties 
themselves could presumably resort to "general clause contracting," 
under which the parties would use general clauses which do not 
"require comprehensive preplanning;"87 there would be no need for 
law-supplied rules. Suggested gap filling in cases where the only 
assumed obstacle is transaction costs would therefore not justify a law-
supplied gap filler because the parties might devise general clauses to 
make up for their lack of foresight. By postulating a world of low 
transaction costs as the basis for determining what provisions would 
have been adopted, certain default rule methodology ignores the 
complexity of the barriers (other than transaction costs) which prevent 
a role for contract law ·to play because "each generic mode of governance (market, hybrid, 
hierarchy, etc.) is supported by and in significant ways is defmed by a distinctive form of 
contract law. The idea of contract laws (plural) rather than of a single, all purpose law of 
contract thus plays an active role in transaction cost economics." !d. (citations omitted). 
84. See Coffey E-mail (July 16, 1996), supra note 47. 
85. !d. 
86. !d.; see also Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, supra note 9, at 651. 
87. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 18, at 48, 67. "Unanticipated 
events could be dealt with by general rules, whereby parties agree to be bound by actions of a 
joint profit-maximizing kind." !d. 
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the parties from achievi_ng lheir goals. Again, oPJy after havi_ng 
identified those barriers can a legal decisionmaker recognize the 
barriers which prevent a private contractual solution and inquire into 
whether parties could devise other private mechanisms to achieve 
shared goals, and if so, at what cost. 
Another analytical difficulty with many default rule formulations 
is that they suggest the law should adopt a rule that the parties might 
hypothetically have wanted in order to lower transaction costs, without 
first determining whether intervention would achieve a certain 
objective better (at less cost) than any private strategies available to 
parties. Such methodology ignores the central issue of why/when a 
law-supplied rule is preferable to nonintervention, and thus avoids lhe 
injunction of Professor Williamson that "transaction costs are always 
assessed in a comparative institutional way."88 
The formulations seem to suggest that the law should adopt a 
default rule whenever doing so would lower the "absolute magnitude 
of transaction costs."89 The Expanded Choice Postulate,90 for 
example, suggests ''that implied terms expand contractors' choices by 
providing standardized and widely suitable 'preformulations,' thus 
eliminating the cost of negotiating every detail of the proposed 
arrangement."91 Prior formulations of the hypothetical bargain 
rationale suggest that the law adopt, as default rules, terms that will 
save parties from incurring transaction costs. Without a comparative 
assessment, however, such formulations cannot determine which 
strategies will better achieve the parties' goals, given the barriers 
which do exist. 
Ayres and Gertner's discussion of the origins of contractual 
incompleteness and the parties' responses to the high transaction cost 
of providing for every contingency illustrates the absence of a 
comparative assessment. In that discussion, Ayres and Gertner posit 
that the parties weigh the costs and benefits of providing for a 
contingency.92 The discussion, however, only incorporates a 
cost/benefit analysis in which parties weigh the actual costs of 
transacting with the "benefits of contractually addressing a particular 
contingency. "93 Thus: 
88. !d. at 22. A comparative assessment should include a consideration of private 
strategies. 
89. !d. As Williamson points out, "it is the difference between rather than the 
absolute magnitude of transaction costs that matters." !d. 
90. See Goetz & Scott, Expanded Choices, supra note 78, at 262. 
91. !d. 
92. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 93. 
93. Jd. at 93. 
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Contracts may be incomplete because the transaction costs of explicitly 
contracting for a given contingency are greater than the benefits. These 
transaction costs may include legal fees, negotiation costs, drafting and 
printing costs, the costs of researching the effects and probability of a 
contingency, and the costs to the parties and the courts of verifYing 
whether a contingency occurred. Rational parties will weigh these 
costs against the benefits of contractually addressing a particular 
. 94 
contingency. 
Ayres and Gertner then explain that under the "would have wanted 
approach," courts will choose to fill gaps to "rrrinimize the costs of 
contracting by choosing the default that most parties would have 
wanted."95 
The use of the "would have wanted approach" is bound to 
promote incorrect gap filling. The cost-benefit analysis fails to include 
a consideration of alternative private approaches which the parties 
might have used to overcome certain problems such as opportunism, 
given the presence of bounded rationality and sunk costs.96 Without 
that comparison, it is hard to discern whether a law-supplied rule 
would indeed be preferred as the one that could achieve the greatest 
"net benefits." 
Charny's explication of several types of hypothetical bargain 
approaches to filling in contractual gaps also lacks a comparative 
approach. For example, Charny indicates that "[i]f the adjudicator 
readily can determine that all transactors would bargain to rule X, and 
would bargain around any other rule Y that differed from rule X, then 
she should adopt rule X"97 That "would sharply reduce the cost of 
transacting."98 This particular formulation ofthe hypothetical bargain 
94. !d. at 92-93 (footnote omitted). 
95. !d. at 93. My colleague, Andrew Morriss, points out that an unwanted side effect 
of default implication is that it may create an "incentive to save on transaction costs by 
leaving terms to the courts. This may inappropriately reduce the costs of contracts" in 
comparison to other choices. See Comments of Andrew P. Morriss, Professor of Law, Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law. 
96. Ayres and Gertner are themselves critical of the traditional approach to gap filling 
which attempts to save parties the transaction costs of negotiating for each contingency. 
They argue that default rule methodology is geared too much to solving problems of 
"contractual incompleteness," which originate in transaction costs of drafting relevant 
provisions. They argue that it fails to account for "a second source of contractual 
incompleteness,"-namely strategizing. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 94. To address 
contractual gaps originating in such cause Ayres and Gertner propose an alternative rule to 
counteract such strategizing. This Article argues that though the recognition of this 
alternative "source of contractual incompleteness" is important, the proposed penalty default 
rule itself fails to justify the proposed law-supplied rule because it fails to engage in a 
complete comparison of alternative approaches. 
97. Chamy, supra note 30, at 1847. 
98. !d. at 1841. 
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neglects the analysis which should precede any inteijection of a law-
supplied term. That analysis should consider (1) whether persuasive 
barriers prevented the achievement of an express bargain and the 
express adoption of a particular rule (X, Y) and (2) whether the law-
supplied rule (X or Y) or a private solution will achieve the pat-ties' 
joint goals, such as maximizing surplus, in a more cost-effective way. 
A second formulation of the hypothetical bargain by Charny also 
neglects the relevant comparison to private strategies. He states that: 
If some transactors will bargain around rule X, and other [sic] will not, 
then the relevant total cost of rule X is the costs of bargaining around 
plus the costs of ex post opportunistic behavior under the rule for those 
who stick with it. The adjudicator should aggregate the costs for each 
alternative rule and choose the rule with the lowest total cost.99 
To justify intervention fully, the adjudicator should also consider 
whether the parties' private strategies for achieving their goals would 
be more costly than a law-supplied rule. Hence, the comparison must 
include not only alternative law-supplied rules, but also private 
strategies for achieving the parties' joint goals. The adjudicator should 
consider not only the costs of bargaining around Rule X and the 
inefficiencies resulting from not bargaining around Rule X, but also 
should compare that aggregate cost to private strategies' costs that 
parties could use to achieve efficiencies. 100 
Thus, the hypothetical bargain rationale, as it has often been 
interpreted, does not provide a complete structure for determining 
what the parties would have wanted, given existing frictions. It 
assumes that the determination of hypothetically preferred terms can 
be made without reference to a cost-benefit comparison to private 
strategies, in tenus of their relative capacity to overcome a multiplicity 
of extant barriers. 
Even criticisms of the hypothetical bargain rationale101 . and 
suggested improvements in the application of the theory do not 
provide a decisionmaker with a complete model. These suggested 
improvements still lack a comparison of the costs of private and law-
supplied strategies for achieving the parties' presumed joint goals, 
99. !d. at 1848. 
100. An alternative formulation by Chamy states that "(i]f transactors will not bargain 
around whatever rule that the adjudicator would adopt, the adjudicator should adopt the rule 
that minimizes ex post costs of opportunistic behavior to transactors taken as a group." !d. at 
1847-48. What is obscured in this formulation is a direct inquiry into whether a law-supplied 
rule would be preferred as the means of reducing opportunistic behavior over private 
strategies for achieving that same goal. 
10 I. See, e.g., id. at 1840-48. 
516 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:497 
such as the maximization of the surplus from trade. 102 Thus, even 
suggested changes to the hypothetical bargain still would not pennit a 
court to justify a law-supplied rule as the least costly solution to any 
perceived problem hampering maximization ofjoint surplus. 
Some criticism of hypothetical bargain theory suggests that the 
theory is unusable in its current form103 because of problems of 
method arising at the level of"generality"104 and "idealization."105 For 
example, the legal decisionmaker does not know whether, in crafting a 
legal rule to govern workers and firms, 106 the court should look to 
individual workers and firms, 107 or to all workers and firms. 108 Nor 
does the decisionmaker know, in formulating a preferred default rule, 
how ideal he should assume transactors to be. 109 The assumption is 
that resolution of the idealization and generality issues would eliminate 
the "confusion" in applications and allow one to apply the hypothetical 
bargain formula to reach correct results. 110 
Attempts to correct the hypothetical bargain theory by resolving 
idealization and generality questions will not achieve the framework 
for justifying a law-supplied term and are therefore misplaced. To the 
extent approaches to hypothetical bargains even contemplate idealized 
bargainers, they will fail because they direct the decisionmaker away 
from realistic behavioral assumptions. Moreover, the focus on 
resolving "generality" issues suggests that there is some way to divine 
what the parties themselves would want if one could decide whether to 
look to the individual transactors or to some larger group to determine 
preferences. Generality issues divert the decisionmaker from key 
"factors responsible for differences among transactions," including 
bounded rationality, opportunism, and sunk costs. 11 1 It is the 
identification of those factors, together with a model of the parties' 
assumed goals based on average preferences that would help the 
l 02. See Goetz & Scott, Mitigation Principle, supra note 80, at 973. 
103. See Chamy, supra note 30, at 1816-17 (discussing both difficulties in how to 
apply the hypothetical bargain theory and more "fundamental problems of justification" in a 
theory which binds parties to obligations "to which we did not assent explicitly"). 
l 04. "Generaiity refers to the extent to which the adjudicator particularizes her 
formulation to the particular transactors whose dispute is before her .... " ld at 1820. 
I 05. "By idealization, I mean the degree to which the interpreter constructs the 
bargain as it would be struck by idealized rather than real-world transactors." !d. at 1820-21. 
I 06. Charny discusses this example in the context of examining "whether to imply a 
good faith term in an employment contract." !d. at 1816. 
107. See id. at 1820-21. 
I 08. See id. 
109. Seeid. at 1817,1820-21. 
110. Seeid.at1816-20. 
Ill. WILLIAMSON, EcONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 18, at 52. 
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decisiomnaker to develop a better "predictive theory of economic 
organization."112 Identification of these factors would also assist the 
decisiomnaker develop a framework to help determine whether a law-
supplied gap filler term would better achieve the parties' goals (by 
overcoming the barriers at a lesser cost) than any private strategy. A 
focus on the individual worker versus all workers113 directs the 
decisionmaker from focusing on assumed joint goals such as the 
maximization ofthe surplus from trade. 114 A.n assessment ofwhat the 
parties hypothetically want cannot be made without a recognition of 
common goals. Furthermore, the assessment requires a comparison of 
private strategies devised to overcome obstacles to achieving the 
parties' assumed joint goals and law strategies for achieving such 
goals. 
Traditional formulations of the hypothetical bargain standard, 
even in revised forms, improperly look exclusively within the contract 
to determine what the parties would bargain toward. These 
formulations neglect to emphasize the confluence of obstacles that the 
parties face in the achievement of mutual gains. Tnese obstacles 
include: behavioral uncertainty or opportunism, bounded rationality, 
and sunk costs. 115 Economists tell us that when those behavioral 
characteristics occur together, barriers may make it difficult for the 
parties to achieve their goal of maximizing mutual gains because of 
contractual di:fficulties. 116 Once those characteristics are recognized, it 
becomes incumbent on a legal decisionmaker to compare the costs and 
benefits of private strategies for overcoming those barriers with those 
of law-supplied rules.117 By neglecting to emphasize the behavioral 
attributes which interfere with mutual gain achievement, the 
methodology fails to inquire as to "how a law-supplied rule could 
move the parties closer to what they wanted (in a narrow sense of 
economic welfare improvement), minimizing the deadweight costs of 
112. !d. 
113. See Chamy, supra note 30, at 1816-17. 
114. See WILLIAMSON, EcONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note .18. 
115. See id. at 45,47-49,52-54,56-59. 
116. See id. at 67. 
117. Thus a legal decisiorunaker deciding whether to supply a just cause limit on an 
employer's right to discharge should consider whether "the commitment accords with the 
objectives likely to be sought, on average, by parties who deal in a less than fully explicit 
manner; ... there are implicit social or other costs to not imposing the commitment ... [and] 
the alternative private devices are more costly than the benefits they could achieve." 
Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, supra note 9, at 674; see also Stewart J. Schwab, 
Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REv. 8 
(1993) (discussing a "coherent framework for understanding the· default rules for 
employment termination"). 
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transacting imposed by .the natural barriers (uncertainty, opportunism 
and sunk costs) and thereby increasing the gain from exchange."118 
The model should instead "make[] assumptions about what [the] 
objectives of parties are and why they did not get there,"1 19 and 
compare the costs and benefits of using law-supplied terms with the 
costs and benefits of private responses to overcome barriers interfering 
with mutual goal achievement. 
IV. PENALTY DEFAULT RULES: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH THAT 
STilL LACKS A JUSTIFICATIVE METHODOLOGY 
The failure of default rule literature to develop fully a 
methodology which can justify law-supplied rules helps to explain the 
dissatisfaction with the current default rules. Ayres and Gertner attack 
the default rule literature for its lack of "a detailed theory of how 
defaults should be set."120 Additionally, in cases involving "rent-
seeking, strategic behavior,"121 they propose to substitute a penalty 
default rule "purposefully set at what the parties would not want-in 
order to encourage the parties to reveal information."122 
This Article challenges Ayres and Gertner's argument that the 
recognition of the reality of strategizing by the parties and the 
deficiencies in current default rules should be solved by replacing the 
hypothetical bargain with a "penalty default rule."123 While the 
penalty default rule offers an apparently plausible rationale of forcing 
the disclosure of strategically held information, ultimately the penalty 
default rule fails to guide decisionmakers on how to fill in contractual 
gaps for several reasons. In order to tmderstand why the penalty 
default theory fails as a means for assessing when the law should 
intervene with a term not expressly negotiated, it is important to 
understand the nature of the Hadley and non-Hadley rules that Ayres 
and Gertner discuss in terms of the nature of legal intervention at issue. 
In a sense, the court in Hadley v. Baxendale had to decide 
whether to intervene with a particular form of sanction----consequential 
damages-which was not expressly adopted by the two parties to the 
contract. 124 In Hadley, the court held that (1) the law should intervene 
I 18. Coffey E-mail (July 16, 1996), supra note 47. 
I 19. Id. 
120. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 9 I. 
121. Id.at94. 
122. Id. at 9 I. 
123. While Ayres and Gertner are correct in arguing that justifications for default rules 
will remain thin without an underlying theory of "how defaults should be set," id. at 9 I, the 
solution does not lie in the adoption of a penalty default rule. 
I 24. I 56 Eng. Rep. I 45, I 45 (Ex. I 854 ). 
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by supplying implied damages that are foreseeable, but (2) specifically 
declined to intervene with a law-supplied rule granting consequential 
damages unless the special circumstances have been previously 
disclosed. 125 In that second prong of the Hadley rule, the court actually 
declines to intervene to supply a damage rule granting consequential 
damages without prior disclosure by the parties. At the same time, the 
court indicates a willingness to imply nonordinary consequential 
damages if the parties had previously disclosed the special 
circumstances. 
Thus, the Hadley case is a complicated example to use as a 
paradigm for judging the appropriateness and efficiency of law-
supplied intervention in the form of a law-supplied term granting 
foreseeable losses, refusing to intervene to supply a sanction for 
consequential losses in the presence of active withholding of 
information, and suggesti_ng an. apparent hypothetical willingness to 
supply consequential damages with disclosure. Without an 
understanding of these interventionist and noninterventionist aspects 
of the Hadley ruling, it becomes difficult to assess the importance of 
Hadley for resolving the critical question of when and why it is ever 
appropriate for the law to intervene with a term or liability rule if the 
parties have failed to negotiate one. 
Ayres and Gertner's treatment of the Hadley rule fails to 
distinguish between the first prong of Hadley, which constituted a 
default rule supplying a damage term by implication, and the second 
prong of the Hadley default rule, which refused to imply the omitted 
damage terms absent prior disclosure. 126 That analytical failure 
obscures the circumstances which justify a legal intervention in the 
form of an implied term and hampers the ability of penalty default rule 
scholars to offer a rule which can explain and justify the full range of 
approaches taken by courts to solve contractual gaps. The real 
problems with current default rules cannot be improved without a 
methodology which (1) rigorously accounts for the behavioral 
attributes of transactions and (2) compares the costs and benefits of 
law-supplied rules with other private strategies to determine which 
approach would be preferred because it is capable of achieving greater 
net benefits. This Article concludes that the hypothetical bargain is 
still a persuasive explanatory theory at least if it is enhanced to include 
a realistic model of behavior and a comparative approach. If 
reformulated in the above described fashion, hypothetical bargain 
125. Seeid.at151. 
126. See generally Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4. 
520 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:497 
theory can provide a useful methodology for justifying law-supplied 
rules. 
Thus, although the suggested adoption of a penalty default rule 
has proved remarkably popular, 127 it, like the traditional hypothetical 
bargain, still lacks a complete methodology for justifying intervention 
taking the form of a law-supplied term. 128 Because an underlying 
framework for detel111in.D.1g when it is appropriate for the law to 
intervene through a default rule is missing from Ayres and Gertner, 
their methodology remains obscure and some of their applications of 
the methodology are unconvincing. 
The shift from a hypothetical bargain rationale to a penalty 
default rule approach remains as unsatisfying as current formulations 
of the current default rule, because it too lacks a methodology aimed at 
explaining why the parties did not achieve their goals on their own and 
what, if anything, the law should do about it. The analytical focus 
should be on whether a law-supplied default rule, of whatever 
character, can solve the goal of the "mitigation of all forms of 
contractual hazard''129-the "source of mutual gain"130-in such a way 
that "no feasible superior alternative can be described and 
implemented with net gains,"131 rather than on a tenninological debate 
on whether we denominate default rules as hypothetical bargains or as 
penalty default rules for punishing "rent-seeking." 
To resolve issues of whether legal intervention in the form of a 
default rule of implied obligation is justified on a comparative "net 
benefit" basis, the methodology must include a complete model of 
realistic behavioral assumptions. 132 Although Ayres and Gertner admit 
to the propensity to strategic opportunism which may affect the 
parties, and seek to craft a legal penalty default rule designed to 
penalize the strategic withholding of information, their analysis fails to 
justify adoption of the legal rule for two reasons. It fails to account for 
a full range of behavioral assumptions. Because they do not identify 
the full range of "factors responsible for differences among 
transactions,"133 they fail to focus on the behavioral attributes of 
bounded rationality and sunk costs. Without a recognition of all the 
factors and the full range of behaviors, Ayres and Gertner cannot 
127. A recent Westlaw search revealed 149 citations to the Ayres and Gertner article. 
128. See infi"a notes 137-160 and accompanying text. 
129. WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE, supra note 7, at 5 (emphasis 
omitted). 
130. !d. at 60. 
13 I. Williamson & Bercovitz, The Modem Corporation, supra note 18, at 333. 
132. See id. at 328-30. 
!33. WILLIAMSON, EcONOMIC INSTI1UT!ONS, supra note 18, at 52. 
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explain why a law-supplied rule would be needed. As Professor 
Williamson explains, even if opportunism were present and "assets are 
specific but economic agents have unrestricted cognitive competence 
. . . . [A] comprehensive bargain is struck at the outset. . . . Contract 
execution problems thus never arise."134 Thus, if opportunism were 
present, it would presumably still be feasible for the parties to devise a 
contract to control for such propensities, were it not for bounded 
rationality. Similarly, even with opportunism and bounded rationality, 
were it not for transaction-specific sunk costs, "[p ]arties to such 
contracts have no continuing interests in the identity of one another."135 
In such cases, parties could simply resort to the market for relie£ 136 
By focusing primarily on strategizing and not admitting to the reality 
of bounded rationality and sunk costs, Ayres and Gertner cannot 
explain why private contract solutions or market solutions are not 
feasible. Thus, Ayres and Gertner do not provide the foundation for 
exploring a range of solutions, whether in the form of private 
arrangements or law-supplied interventions, to the market and contract 
failures. 
L11 the context of the Hadley fact pattern, a multitude of factors 
may interfere with contractual and market solutions to the problem of 
opportunism by the high-risk miller who wishes to conceal his type in 
order to secure a lower shipping cost. Bounded rationality could make 
it difficult and costly to design schemes to control the opportunistic 
nonrevelation by high-risk millers. These schemes might include a 
menu of contracts with different prices to ferret out different types of 
millers. Additionally, because the carrier invests sunk costs in hauling 
the miller's product, the carrier could not seek market relief by simply 
selling the shipping services to another party because they are not 
salvageable in that fashion. 
An examination of these behavioral attributes of sunk costs and 
bounded rationality would help to lay the foundation for a law-
supplied rule by highlighting the difficulties and costs of private 
counterstrategies for combating opportunism. By failing to focus on 
all the behavioral attributes, Ayres and Gertner's embrace of a law-
supplied rule remains problematic. 
Ayres and Gertner's justification for the Hadley rule also remains 
problematic because it fails to examine whether the presence of 
identified strategic behavior, by itself, justifies legal intervention in the 
I 34. I d. at 30-31. 
135. I d. at 31. 
136. Seeid. 
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form of a particular default rule. Their failure to address that 
fundamental inquiry can be explained by their failure to parse the 
Hadley rule in terms of legal intervention. Consequently, they have 
viewed the Hadley rule as a penalty default rule that is an example of a 
legal intervention or response to strategic behavior.137 Yet, they fail to 
brealc Hadley into its three parts: (1) the court's law-supplied term of 
ordinary and foreseeable damages, (2) the court's law-supplied term of 
consequential damages with prior disclosure, and (3) the court's 
refusal to supply a term of consequential damages absent prior 
disclosure. 
Because of that analytical failure they completely fail to focus at 
all on the aspect of Hadley which does intervene by supplying 
consequential damages if there has been prior disclosure. Therefore, 
they fail to ask whether the law-supplied aspect of the Hadley rule 
. would operate to achieve the parties' goals at a lesser cost than other 
private mechanisms. The justification for the legal intervention that 
rlnP~ Pvid-in thP fnrrn nf thP nrnncr nf thP T-!nrll011 ntlP imnhrincr 
~~~~ ~ .. ·~· ... ···~ ·~···· ~· --·~ y·~··o ~· --·~ ··~···~J ·-·~ .... I: .. J ···o 
consequential damages with prior disclosure-remains incomplete. 
Ayres and Gertner appear to focus on the prong of the Hadley rule 
which is actually a failure by the law to intervene, a refusal to engage 
in implication. They regard the refusal to intervene as equivalent to a 
case of an intervention of a law-supplied term or liability rule. They 
never attempt to explain why the Hadley rule-judicial intervention 
implying consequential damages with prior disclosure-is the 
preferred means of curbing opportunism. They do not explore other 
possible solutions to opportunism, including private ones. Ayres and 
Gertner seem to assume that the presence of strategic propensities 
alone will 'justify strategic contractual interpretations by courts" as a 
way of"reduc[ing] the opportunities for this rent-seeking behavior."138 
In assuming that courts should control rent-seeking behavior (to avoid 
inefficient gaps), Ayres and Gertner have assumed, perhaps 
incorrectly, lhat the role of law is to "reduce the opportunities for this 
rent-seeking behavior."139 
Oliver Williamson argues that given the inevitable presence of 
opportunistic behavior, with its consequent inefficiencies, the question 
becomes how the ill effects of such rent-seeking behavior can be 
minimized. 140 Parties themselves might adopt certain governance 
137. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 103. 
138. I d. at 94. 
139. Jd. 
140. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 18, at 48, 63; Williamson 
& Bercovitz, The Modem Corporation, supra note 18, at 332. 
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structures (such as vertical integration) to minimize such opportunistic 
behavior. The questions become: (1) how the transaction costs can be 
minimized and (2) with what approach (governance structure, private 
counterstrategy or legal default rule) will the parties be able to achieve 
greater "net benefits." Minimizing such transaction costs would not 
necessarily entail the adoption of a law-supplied rule and thus it is 
misguided for Ayres and Gertner to assume that it is for the law to 
"reduce the opportunities for this rent-seeking behavior."141 Parties 
themselves may be able to control for opportunism in more cost-
effective ways. Because they have focused exclusively on the 
declining to intervene aspects of Hadley, they have avoided the 
comparative analysis central to justifying law-supplied terms. 
The failure to engage in a comparative approach assessing 
relative net benefits has also led Ayres and Gertner astray by focusing 
their inquiry on the benefits of a particular default rule in encouraging 
the disclosure of information. As they explain, "by setting the default 
rule in favor of the uninformed party, the courts induce the informed 
party to reveal information, and, consequently, the efficient contract 
results. "i 42 
Of course, once they point out the efficiency benefits of having 
the information disclosed, it seems incontestable that the law should 
encourage such revelation. In reality, however, this analysis obscures 
the question for the legal decisionmaker. The question is not whether 
there are any benefits to be gained from a law-supplied default ·rule, 
but whether the benefits from the law-supplied Hadley rule-
intervening to grant consequential damages with prior disclosure and 
declining to do so absent disclosure-are greater than the benefits that 
could be obtained by private efforts, given the obstacles hindering 
efficiency that exist (including strategizing). 
Resolving the question of which approach will achieve greater 
"net benefits" requires a recognition that the Hadley and Baxendale 
problem (identified by Ayres and Gertner) raises the well lrnown 
problem encountered in the insurance context: that of adverse 
selection and of asynnnetric information.143 The catTier cannot tell if 
141. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 94. 
142. !d. at 99. 
143. Adverse selection is an insurance term and "is a consequence of the inability of 
insurers to distinguish between risks and the unwillingness of poor risks candidly to disclose 
their true risk condition." WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 18, at 47; see 
also Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE 
STRUCTURE OF BusiNEss 37, 38-40 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985) 
(discussing adverse selection as problem of "hidden information"). 
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he is dealing with a high-cost or low-cost miller. 144 Based on the 
recognition of adverse selection and the propensity to conceal one's 
type, Ayres and Gertner argue that a default rule should be adopted 
which gives the high-cost miller consequential damages only if the 
information is disclosed. The Hadley problem is like all situations in 
which there is adverse selection: because a less informed party may 
not be able to recognize the difference between two types, a pooling 
problem exists. 
Once the adverse selection problem is accounted for, the central 
question is whether the law should intervene with a term implying 
consequential damages if information is disclosed, but at the same 
time refuse to supply such consequentials absent disclosure. Ayres 
and Gertner do not fully resolve that question. Ayres and Gertner's 
analysis of the Hadley rule rests on a comparison of "two possible 
defaults: denying or awarding the high, unforeseeable damages."145 
They conclude that intervening to supply consequentials with 
disclosure, but declining to do so absent disclosure will be preferable 
to the non-Hadley rule. This is so because the Hadley rule will 
encourage high-cost millers to contract around the rule and doing so 
will result in a "'separating' equilibrium,"146 in which high-cost millers 
reveal their type and thereby avoid the inefficiency and cost associated 
with the nonrevelation of the high-cost types. Ayres and Gertner argue 
that the Hadley rule thus helps to avoid the inefficiencies and costs that 
would be generated under a non-Hadley rule when the high-cost 
millers choose, for strategic reasons, "to remain undistinguished from 
their low-ris.k counterparts. "147 
Ayres and Gertner compare the efficiencies that would be gained 
from the adoption of a legally supplied Hadley rule with the 
inefficiencies that would arise under the adoption of a non-Hadley 
high damage rule that gave consequential damages without regard to 
whether special circumstances were revealed. Inefficiencies would 
result under a non-Hadley rule because the high damage millers would 
conceal their type, causing the carries to take insufficient 
precautions. 148 A non-Hadley rule would provide no incentive for type 
revelation because "high-damage millers will not reveal their true 
144. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at Ill (detailing tendency of high-cost miller 
to conceal information about its status in order to "receive the subsidized shipping price" that 
will obtain when the shipper cannot distinguish between high- and low-cost millers). 
I45. !d. at 108. 
I46. See id. at I I2. 
I47. Id.at!II. 
I48. See id. at I I2. 
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status to the carriers because they would be forced to pay more ... but 
would gain no additional coverage."149 
What Ayres and Gertner do not resolve through their comparison 
is whether a law-supplied damage rule of a particular content granting 
consequential damages with prior disclosure would be preferred to 
both (1) a law-supplied rule granting consequential damages absent 
disclosure and (2) private strategies that the parties might employ on 
their own to induce separation. In choosing an appropriate default rule 
one must recognize that opportunism and self-concealment are 
pervasive and are likely to arise in situations where bounded 
rationality and sunk costs are present. To fully resolve whether a law-
supplied damage rule of a particular content is justified and would 
maximize joint gains from trade better than other possibilities, 
including both private and law-supplied rules, one would have to 
compare other mechanisms that carriers could devise to overcome the 
pooling problem, such as screening devices to identify low- and high-
cost millers and signaling by low-cost millers to identify their type. To 
determine whether there is any justification for the law supplying the 
Hadley damage rule, one would have to ask:150 would such a rule 
maximize joint gains from trade by 
moving the parties closer to what they wanted in a narrow sense of 
welfare improvement, minimizing the deadweight costs of transacting 
imposed by the material barriers (uncertainty, sunk costs and 
opportunism) and thereby increasing the gain from exchange ... 
count[ing] all the benefits and costs of imposing a law-supplied term, as 
contrasted with the benefit and costs of not doing so?151 
A decisionmaker cannot decide, in the abstract, whether th-e Hadley 
rule is preferred without reference to a comparative net benefit 
assessment. 
The legal decisionmaker cannot decide if the law-supplied 
Hadley rule is justified by comparing it to a law-supplied rule giving 
all consequential damages even if special circumstances are not 
disclosed. 152 The question should be whether the law-supplied Hadley 
rule can better promote separation (and thereby the prevention or 
reduction of the loss and in~:fficiency that results from poolingY 53 at a 
149. !d. at 111. 
150. See id. at 103 (alerting reader to menu concept and noting its complexities). 
151. Coffey E-mail (July 16, 1996), supra note 47. 
152. This is what Ayres and Gertner appear to do when they compare the costs and 
benefits of a Hadley rule with an alternative legal rule granting all consequential damages 
even if special circumstances are not disclosed by the affected party beforehand. 
153. See Coffey E-mail (July 16, 1996), supra note 47. 
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lesser cost than any private strategies to contain such loss and thereby 
maximize joint gains from trade. Will the award of a sanction and 
remedies afforded by the Hadley rule achieve greater net benefits over 
private strategies designed to achieve the loss from non-separation that 
inevitably results from strategizing (and opportunistic behavior) by the 
parties. Assuming that the parties want to maximize efficiency gains, 
and that certain barriers, including adverse selection, interfere with the 
achievement of those efficiency gains, the law should seek to intervene 
with a law-supplied term only when there is a greater "net benefit" 
from doing so than the net benefits from alternative approaches, such 
as private mechanisms designed to curb opportunistic behavior and 
overcome adverse selection problems. 
Revision of the methodology used to determine whether the law 
· should supply the Hadley rule would lead to an expansion of the 
analysis used in judging whether a particular rule is efficient. Ayres 
and Gertner explain: 
High-damage millers will contract armmd the Hadley, low-damage 
default when the cost of inefficient precaution ... is larger than the cost 
of contracting around the default . . . . If the additional costs of 
contracting around the Hadley default are sufficiently small, all high-
damage millers will contract for the efficient amount of insurance.154 
Ayres and Gertner posit that the effect of the Hadley default is that 
high-damage millers will no longer withhold information and 
separation will occur. 
The question should not be whether the Hadley rule will induce 
separation but rather whether the law-supplied Hadley rule or other 
law-supplied rules or private strategies (such as offering different rate 
contracts) will be able to achieve the greatest reductions in the loss 
from pooling and the greatest increase in joint gains from trade and net 
benefits. If that comparison is inquired into, then the Hadley rule may 
still be preferred, though it is not automatically the preferred rule. 
Once the comparison of relative net benefits is extended to 
include private counterstrategies, it becomes easy to understand why 
the "comparison" must extend beyond a contrast of the Hadley-rule to 
the non-Hadley high-damage default rule so central to the Ayres and 
Gertner analysis. Comparison with a different law-supplied rule 
cannot resolve the ultimate question of whether private strategies or 
law-supplied rules will curb opportunistic behavior and maximize 
gains from trade. 
154. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at II 0. 
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The methodology should be reformulated. In considering 
whether the law-supplied sanction ought to include consequentials 
when special circumstances are not disclosed, adoption of which has 
not been specifically negotiated by the parties, the legal decisionmaker 
should consider the likely inefficiencies from pooling that would apply 
if the court implied no damage rule at all unless expressly negotiated. 
The legal decisionmaker should also consider the results if the parties 
are left to negotiate private solutions to pooling, as well as the relative 
inefficiencies that would be attained under a law-supplied Hadley low-
damage default and a non-Hadley high damage default. 
Reformulation of the methodology for law-supplied interventions 
to include a comparative net benefit standard of the kind suggested in 
this Article would be advantageous. Not only would it provide the 
basis for fully justifying a law-supplied rule, but it could help to 
explain, with more robust explanatory power than the penalty default 
rule, a variety of other gap filling default rules. The methodology of 
this Article suggests that a court should intervene if it is convinced that 
persuasive barriers including opportunism, sunk costs, and uncertainty 
prevent the achievement of assumed goals and if it is convinced that 
iegal intervention will "move the parti~s closer to what they wanted"155 
in a second-best world than other private mechanisms would. 
This comparative approach could enhance the analysis of a 
variety of default rules. One such rule examined by Ayres and Gertner 
is the default rule refusing to supply a quantity term where the parties 
fail to agree on one.156 Ayres and Gertner label this approach a penalty 
default rule because a court will ordinarily refuse to supply any 
quantity should the parties fail to select a quantity. This refusal stands 
in contrast to a variety of other default rules, in which courts supply a 
wide variety ofterms by implication.157 Ayres and Gertner explain the 
"zero quantity" default rule as a penalty default rule (preferred by 
neither party) designed to force the disclosure of information ex ante 
by the parties. 158 As Ayres and Gertner explain: 
155. Coffey E-mail (July 16, 1996), supra note 47. 
156. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 95-97. 
157. For example, "Another term that courts often supply is one imposing a duty of 
'best' or 'reasonable' efforts." E. ALLAJ'I FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.17, at 509 (3d ed. 
1999). Courts may supply terms which are missing "the terms of the contract are reasonably 
certain." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 (1981). Courts may also imply 
obligations of good faith which have not been expressly agreed to. See id. § 205. Courts 
have also implied obligations not to revoke offers which have been relied on. See id. §§ 45, 
87. Courts have also supplied just cause limitations "protecting employees against 
opportunistic terminations." Schwab, supra note 117, at 38. 
158. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 95-97. 
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We suggest that the zero-quantity default crumot be explained by a 
<;what the parties would have wanted" principle. Instead, a rationale for 
the rule can be found by comparing the cost of ex ante contracting to 
the cost of ex post litigation. The zero-quantity rule can be justified 
because it is cheaper for the parties to establish the quantity term 
beforehand than for the courts to determine after the fact what the 
parties would have wanted. 159 
The rationale suggested by Ayres and Gertner-that ''it is cheaper 
for the parties to establish the quantity tenn beforehand than for the 
courts to determine after the fact what the parties would have 
wanted"160-seems to explain the unwillingness of courts to supply the 
missing quantity term. However, the rationale is an incomplete 
explanation that does not fully explain the approach taken by the 
courts to contractual gaps. A complete explanation for the approach of 
courts' refusal to supply a term (such as quantity) cannot be developed 
without reference to the larger group of cases involving the issue of 
whether and under what circumstances the courts will supply a term 
regard~1g quantity if the parties have not agreed to it expressly. 
The courts do not uniformly refuse to supply an implied term in a 
contract lacking a quantity term. 161 Where courts do refuse, that 
re:fhsal to intervene by supplying quantity should be cast as a rule in 
which courts refuse to supply a term by implication, thus refusing to 
add or delete terms agreed on by the parties. Because Ayres and 
Gertner treat the refusal of courts to supply a term (for instance, 
quantity) on the same terms as a legal intervention which takes the 
form of a law-supplied rule (for instance, the Hadley mle) and attempt 
to offer a unifying rationale of forced information disclosure for both, 
they fail to focus on the critical issue of when and why a court should 
refuse to supply a term and when and why it should intervene through 
a law-supplied term. When this distinction is drawn, it becomes clear 
that the refusal of courts to supply a quantity term is not a legal 
intervention of a default rule of implication requiring justification. If 
one draws careful distinctions between cases which warrant legal 
intervention in the form of an implied term from those that do not, then 
one can rationalize the full range of approaches taken.in particular 
doctrinal areas and develop more persuasive explanations for the 
159. Id.at96. 
160. Id. 
161. An example in which courts may enforce a contract lacking a specific quantity 
term is the requirements contract in which "the buyer's duty to purchase is determined by its 
requirements, as to which the buyer has some discretion." FARNSWORTH, supra note 157, 
§ 7.17. 
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courts' variegated approaches than the penalty default information 
disclosure rationale. 
Recognizing the distinction between default rules that supply 
implied terms and default rules that refuse to do so would help to 
explain the differing approaches to the issue of omitted quantity tenns. 
In some instances, the courts refuse to intervene by supplying a 
quantity term. 162 The true rationale for such refusal, however, does not 
lie within the penalty default/information forcing rationale. The true 
reason for courts refusing to supply quantity, at least in one-shot spot 
trades, is that there is no particular reason for courts to intervene with a 
law-supplied tenn when there are no persuasive barriers to the parties 
reaching a fully contingent contract by specifying quantity on their 
own. 163 In other instances where the quantity is not specified, 
however, and the transaction is more complicated because it is a long-
term contract and sunk costs are required by one or both parties, the 
court will imply a tenn of good faith to determine whether a particular 
quantity demanded should be honored. 164 In such cases, courts are 
willing to allow parties to specify, only incompletely, the quantity 
term. The true explanation for the court's greater willingness to imply 
a term of good faith to supplement gaps in the quantity tenn is that in 
some contexts the parties can operate only in a second-best world 
beset by natural barriers to complete contractual specificity. Parties to 
a long-term contract, because of bounded rationality and uncertainty 
problems, may be unable to foresee the quantities required, which may 
be over a long term period of time, and thus be unable to commit ex 
ante to a completely contingent express quantity term in the contract. 
I 62. See cases cited in Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at n.43. 
I63. Presumably, the problems of bounded rationality can limit the possibility of 
comprehensive contracting when there is uncertainty. The unforeseeability of the future 
would not be particularly burdensome when the transaction is discrete and not continuing. 
Nor would the characteristic of opportunism pose particular contracting difficulties in cases 
in which there is no opportunity for such behavior. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC 
INSTITUTIONS, supra note I 8, at 48. Finally, the absence of sunk costs would mean that the 
parties could simply arrange for "new trading relations." Jd. at 59. Thus it would not be 
important to devise governance structures or contract terms to minimize the hazards and costs 
9f opportunism. 
I 64. Courts are thus willing to enforce indefmite quantity terms in the context of 
output and requirement contracts. Output and requirements contracts lack a defmite quantity, 
specifYing either that quantity shall be such as to meet a buyer's requirements or that the 
quantity shall b.e measured by the seller's output. These contracts are governed by section 2-
306 of the U.C.C. That section provides for an implied term of good faith in order to 
determine whether a buyer's demands under a requirements contract or a seller's output 
under an output contract should be honored. See U.C.C. § 2-306 (1995). Thus, courts may 
be willing to allow the quantity to remain unspecified in contexts in which it is not feasible to 
achieve an express contract. 
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Problems of opportunism might interfere with a general clause under 
which "[ u ]nanticipated events could be dealt with by general rules, 
whereby the parties agree to be bound by actions of a joint profit-
maximizing kind."165 In such cases, because of the impediments to the 
parties specifying a fully contingent quantity term by express contract 
ex ante, and because of the costliness of obstacles to less burdensome 
alternatives, a court may be willing to imply a term of good faith to 
measure quantity. Because the implied term (of good faith) may be 
preferred to any other solutlons166 that the parties themselves could 
devise to achieve their goals while "minimizing the deadweight costs 
of transacting,"167 the court may supply it. The rationale seems tied 
not so much to a desire of comis to force the disclosure of information, 
as it does to a desire to limit cases of judicial intervention to instances 
when the costs of parties specifying a term may be more costly than 
the court's solution. Thus, the focus should not be on whether it is less 
costly as a general matter to force parties to agree on a term ex ante 
t"'Jan to have the cow--t supply it ex post. Rather, it should be on an 
identification of those circumstances in which the parties can adopt a 
term to achieve their purposes more cheaply than the court and to 
separate those circumstances from cases in which it may be cheaper 
for the court to intervene with an implied term, given the costliness of 
private efforts to achieve a goal such as ma::1taining flexibility and 
curtailing opportun.i.sm with regard to quantity demands in a long-term 
contract. 
Calling the zero quantity default a penalty default rule does not 
have enough robust explanatory power to rationalize the full range of 
approaches talcen by courts on the quantity issue. A recognition of the 
barriers which may interfere with the parties' assumed goals allows 
one to rationalize both approaches. Thus, courts refuse to supply 
terms where barriers do not exist and at the same time willingly supply 
terms when barriers to greater contractual specificity do exist, by 
supplementing quantity terms with a good faith discretionfuy 
component. 
Limitations in the explanatory power of the per.alty default rule 
can also be seen in the discussion of corporate statutes. The full range 
of judicial approaches taken to contractual gaps and the greater 
explanatory power of this approach is tied to an analysis of the barriers 
to contracting and a comparative net benefits approach. Courts "refuse 
165. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC lNSTIT1ITIONS, supra note 18, at 48. 
166. These might include a general clause promising not to act opportunistically. 
Because of problems of opportunism, that solution may not be feasible. 
167. Coffey E-mail (July 16, 1996), supra note 47. 
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to enforce corporate charters"168 made without information on "the 
number of authorized shares, the address . . . for legal process and, 
indeed, the state of incorporation."169 Ayres and Gertner analogize the 
corporate law approach to the common law's "refusal to enforce vague 
or indefinite contracts."170 
However, the courts are not uniformly opposed to filling in gaps 
in contracts; sometimes they are willing to enforce contracts with 
vague terms. 171 Therefore, the central question is what explains the 
variability in the willingness oflegislatures, and courts to supply terms 
or enforce otherwise vague contracts. The true explanation for the 
legislatures' unwillingness to enforce corporate charters made without 
the number of authorized shares may be that no persuasive barriers 
exist to prevent the parties from specifYing that information on their 
own. In contrast, in cases where persuasive barriers might have 
interfered with the achievement ex ante of a complete contingent term, 
the court might be willing to enforce contracts that would otherwise 
fail for indefiniteness. In these cases, courts will consider the costs of 
mechanisms that the parties might themselves undertalce to overcome 
barriers to specificity and consider the costs of such mechanisms along 
with the costs oflegal intervention. 
Open recognition of the remediableness methodology together 
with a clear understanding of the difference between a court refusing 
to supply a term and a court intervening with a law-supplied term will 
not only provide a better means of explaining the range of approaches 
talcen, but it will also permit decisionmakers to understand and justify 
law-supplied rules in tenns of the seemingly discredited hypothetical 
bargain rationale. The discrediting of the majoritarian hypothetical 
bargain basis for implied default rules depends on Ayres's and. 
Gertner's suggestion that in some cases it may be preferable to choose 
a rule not preferred by the majority. 172 They posit that "ifthe majority 
is more likely to contract around the minority's preferred default rule 
(than the minority is to contract around the majority's rule), then 
choosing the minority's default may lead to a larger set of efficient 
contracts.'' 173 
168. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 98. 
!69. !d. at 97-98. 
170. !d. at 98. 
171. See, e.g., Borg Warner Corp. v. Anchor Coupling Co., !56 N.E.2d 513 (Ill. 1958) 
(holding that a contract to sell company existed despite indefmiteness in agreement relating 
to terms for key employees). 
172. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 93. 
173. !d. 
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Choosing the rule preferred by the minority seems to undermine 
the majoritarian premise for implied default rules. However, the 
seeming rejection of a majority's default rule may be based not on its 
majoritarian character but on an analysis of whether significant 
contracting barriers prevented the adoption of the majority's preferred 
rule. "[I]f the majority is more likely to contract around the mi_r1ority's 
preferred default rule"174 than vice versa, it may well be that the 
majority can achieve its own goals by contract, and thus there would 
be no persuasive basis for the court to intervene by supplying a rule. 
However, if it is difficult for the minority to contract out of the 
majority's preferred rule, that may well be because persuasive barriers 
to contracting exist which prevent the minority from achieving 
efficient contracts on its own. 
Thus, the court's reason for intervening would be that barriers to 
contracting exist and the law-supplied rule will achieve greater net 
benefits than either (1) nonintervention or (2) ot.~er private strategies. 
Thus, the rejection of the majority's preferences in formulating a 
default rule may depend, implicitly, on an assessment of why the 
parties did not achieve their objectives by express contractual 
provision and whether the law should intervene by supplying a term. 
In cases where the majority could easily "contract arotmd the 
minority's preferred default rule"175 ~he court may conclude that 
barriers to achievement of the parties' own goals did not exist. In such 
a case, the court is and should be disinclined t\.; intervene because the 
parties can achieve their goals privately. 
In contrast, where significant barriers exist, as might be the case 
where the minority has difficulty contracting out of the majority's rule, 
there may be grounds for a law-supplied rule. This rule is most 
appropriate when the court is convinced on a comparative cost basis 
that the law-supplied rule will achieve the parties' preferences better 
than any private counterstrategies the parties might implement to 
overcome barriers to private contracting. Thus, the basis for rejecting 
a majority's preferences may be based not on a rejection of the 
preference because it is shared by a majority, but because there is no 
reason to intervene where barriers to achieving the parties' own goals 
do not exist. 
Once the realities of a second-best world beset by natural barriers 
is fully recognized and the decisionmaker accepts that it may not be 
possible to achieve what the parties would want in a first-best world, it 
174. !d. 
175. !d. 
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becomes possible to rationalize the Hadley rule itself in terms of a new 
and more robust version of the ''would have wa11.ted" hypothetical 
bargain standard.176 Under that standard, the court intervenes with a 
law-supplied damage rule in cases where the intervention best 
decreases the "deadweight loss" and does so more cheaply than any 
private strategies the parties might use. 
To justify the Hadley rule-which implies consequential 
damages with prior disclosure-in hypothetical bargain terms, one 
begins with a world in which one must make certain assumptions 
about the parties' objectives. It must be assumed that the parties 
jointly want to maximize the gain from trade "irrespective of who ends 
up with what portion of the gain."177 At the same time it must be 
recognized that in the Hadley scenario, as in most contracting 
scenarios, the parties themselves must necessarily operate in a second-
best world, 178 which contains natural barriers that will interfere with 
the achievement of the parties' goals. In this second-best world, the 
parties will presumably choose rules which will "most reduce 
deadweight loss."179 
Under this second-best world, the Hadley rule may be justified in 
terms of what the parties would want. Arguably, the parties ''who 
would be revealed as worthier than others by the imposition of a 
default rule that separates them from the inferior[,] actually 'want' ex 
ante such a rule."180 The Hadley rule, for example, "permits them [the 
worthier lower damage millers] to better separate themselves than 
would private strategies,"181 and thus to save themselves the costs of 
signaling and separating. The law-supplied rule is thereby preferred at 
some point, namely when the benefits from separating are outweighed 
by the costs of signaling such information. The lower damage millers 
who do not opt out of the rule are automatically identified as lower 
damage millers and therefore ''worthier." Even the inferior (the high-
cost millers), who would arguably prefer to remain indistinguishable in 
order to receive a "cross-subsidized price"182 from the carrier, will not 
want to do so. An inferior party would not complain because "it is 
hard to see why he would complain, except to pine for a supernormal 
profit from a pooling equilibrium which as Akerlof points out, is 
176. I am indebted to my colleague, Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law, for his valuable insights on this subject. 
177. CoffeyE-mail(July 16, 1996),supranote47. 
178. See Memorandum from Peter M. Gerhart, supra note 35. 
179. Jd. 
180. See Coffey E-mail (July 16, 1996), supra note 47. 
181. Jd. 
182. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 4, at 1 00. 
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transitory at best, because the worthies keep dropping out."183 Thus, 
even the high-cost millers would be no worse off under a Hadley rule 
permitting separation. 
The Ayres and Gertner penalty default approach fails to separate 
out the strand of Hadley which represents a legal intervention from the 
strand of Hadley which represents a refusal to intervene by 
implication. By disguising the law-supplied aspect of Hadley, the 
authors hamper their ability to recognize the need for a justificative 
analysis for law-supplied terms. They also fail to develop or utilize 
comparative methodologies which examine the costs and benefits of 
private solutions, and fail to develop an explanatory theory io explain 
fully differences in the variability in the willingness of courts and legal 
decisionmakers to intervene with law-supplied terms. 
V. LAW-SUPPLIED OBLIGATIONS IN THE PRECONTRACTUAL CONTEXT 
Default rule methodology should be incorporated by legal 
decisionmakers who must decide in a variety of contexts whether to 
intervene with a law-supplied obligation when the parties have failed 
expressly to adopt the obligation. Because many "practical 
constraints"184 limit the parties' ability to achieve a fully contingent 
contract that resolves all matters ex ante, gaps in contracts are 
inevitable.185 
One context in which the parties may fail to resolve all issues by 
an express reciprocal agreement and in which the issue of law-
supplied obligation will command central attention is that of 
preliminary precontractual negotiation. In this context, one party will 
seek to withdraw, claiming that free withdrawal is permitted because 
the parties did not achieve a contract with consideration; the other 
party will claim that its justifiable reliance ought to malce the promise 
irrevocable and binding. The issue that arises is whether the law 
should imply any commitment to govern the precontractual 
negotiations. 
Many of the current attempts to resolve questions of 
precontractual reliance protection are misguided: they suffer from a 
failure to develop an underlying framework which can resolve the 
question of legal intervention. First, they do not adequately identify 
183. Coffey E-mail (July 16, 1996), supra note 47 (referring to George A. Akerlof, 
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. EcoN. 
488 (1970)). 
184. See Chamy, supra note 30, at 1819. 
185. See WILUAMSON, EcONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 18, at 70 (discussing 
impossibility of completely contingent contracts in certain settings). 
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the relevant structural features of the transaction which are responsible 
for "differences among transactions"186 and which would help to 
resolve whether a law-supplied rule would be necessary or whether 
private contractual solutions or other private arrangements are 
possible. They obscure the law-supplied nature of the suggested 
default rule and thus fail to grapple with a well recognized 
comparative methodology useful in detennining iflegal intervention is 
justified. In determining if such intervention is justified, the rule 
proposers fail to compare the costs and benefits of a law-supplied rule 
of implied commitment with private mechanisms which could be 
employed by the parties to overcome the barriers to contractual 
solutions. 
A. Craswell s Approach 
Professor Craswell's scholarly treatment of precontractual 
reliance illustrates a recent attempt to resolve the question of implied 
commitment for precontractual negotiations. 187 Craswell 's treatment 
of the topic ulti_mately fails to justify fully a law-supplied commitment 
in the precontractual context because it lacks crucial elements of a 
justificative framework. Craswell fails to identify all of the behavioral 
assumptions in his analysis of the transactions at issue. While the 
analysis adverts to a salient feature of precontractual negotiations-the 
presence of asset specific investments of one party-which may make 
the investing party choose ''too little reliance, relative to the efficient 
level,"188 there is a failure to advert to the other crucial transactional 
features, namely bounded rationality and opportunism. 
Without a full treatment of those transactional features, it is not 
clear why the parties themselves could not solve the suboptimal 
reliance problem by contractual devices. The failure to account for all 
of these differences makes it difficult for a decisionmaker to resolve 
the question of whether a law-supplied obligation is needed. As 
Oliver E. Williamson explains, when one or more, but not all, of these 
features is present, private contractual or market solutions are still 
possible.189 Thus, the presence of sunk costs, even in conjunction with 
opportunism, could presumably still be solved by contract if bounded 
186. I d. at 52. 
187. See Craswell, Efficient Reliance, supra note 9. Professor Craswell also treats a 
number of other "contract formation doctrines," and considers them all through the unifying 
theme of "the efficiency of ... reliance" by the promisee. Jd. at 507; see also Kostritsky, 
Bargaining with Uncertainty, supra note 9, at 342-62 (discussing Craswell's methodology). 
188. Craswell, Efficient Reliance, supra note 9, at 492. 
189. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 18, at 30-31. 
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rationality were not a problem and "economic agents have unrestricted 
cognitive competence."190 
Consider alternatively the situation where agents are subject to 
bounded rationality and transactions are supported by specific assets, 
but the condition of opportunism is assumed to be absent .... 
Although gaps will appear in these contracts, because of bounded 
rationality, they do not pose execution hazards if the parties take 
recourse to a self-enforcing general clause.191 
The failure to highlight the structural barriers to private solutions 
helps explain another defect in Craswell's approach to precontractual 
liability: the failure to compare the "benefits (including costs avoided) 
and costs (including benefits foregone) of imposing ... a law-supplied 
term or terms, as contrasted with the benefits and costs of not doing 
so."192 Without a full account of the structural barriers, one cannot 
compare the costs and benefits of the private strategies which might be 
used to overcome the barriers to achieve certain goals, such as curbing 
opportunism, in order to maximize the available surplus with the costs 
and benefits of a law-supplied rule. 
The failure to explore the reality of the structural defects of a 
second-best world helps to explain why Craswell is willing to suggest 
the presence of a law-supplied implied commitment without a 
comparative analysis. Instead, Craswell based his endorsement of an 
efficient reliance approach on the perceived benefits to both parties 
from such a commitment. He explains that "courts are entitled to 
consider the efficiency of B[uyer]'s reliance."193 In effect, Craswell 
justifies a rule of irrevocability and of enforceable obligation based on 
the perceived mutual benefits to the parties. 194 Craswell uses projected 
mutual benefits to the parties to explain why parties themselves might 
agree to such enforceable commitrnents195 and thus as a reason why 
courts might or should imply an enforceable obligation to protect 
efficient reliance. The justification for the rule, however, seems 
incomplete. A proposal to justify a law-supplied connnitrnent must 
rest on a foundation other than perceived mutual benefit. If the 
obligation is in the interest of both parties, then a legal decisionmaker 
deciding whether to imply a tenn not agreed to must face the question 
190. !d. at 30. 
191. !d. at 31. 
192. Coffey E-mail (July 16, 1996), supra note 47. 
193. Craswell, Efficient Reliance, supra note 9, at 507. 
194. See id. at 495. 
195. See id. (discussing mutual benefits to Buyer and Seller from an enforceable 
obligation). 
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of why the parties did not expressly adopt the term or obligation.196 
Resolving that question requires the decisionmaker to advert to the 
structural barriers facing the parties and interfering with private 
solutions to handle perceived problem_s-such as opportunism-which 
interfere with agreed-on goals such as the maximization of gains from 
trade. Only by adverting to those structural barriers and comparing 
private "noninterventionist ways of sunnounting those barriers"197 
with the law-supplied rules can legal intervention be justified fully. 
The failure to advert to the structural barriers interfering with 
private solutions can also be seen in Craswell's treatment of unilateral 
contracts. Traditionally, the unilateral contract rule permitted the 
offeror to revoke any time up until the offeree completed 
performance. 198 Modem law is to the contrary: Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts section 45 protects the offeree who begins performance 
by making the offer irrevocable upon such commencement.199 ill 
effect, courts are implying a term of irrevocability though the parties 
did not expressly bargain for one.200 
Because the offeror '\vill not have explicitly stated whether she 
wanted her commitment to become irrevocable once B [offeree] began 
to perform,"201 there is an impmia11t i.11terpretive question 
(aclmowledged by Craswell) for courts: should the court nevertheless 
supply a term of irrevocability. Craswell resolves that question of 
interpretation by reference to the offeror's hypothetical intent: "it is 
easy to find cases where courts seem to interpret S(eller]'s offer as 
irrevocable when B[uyer] begins to perform precisely because 
B[uyer]'s reliance is the sort that S[eller] would have wanted to 
induce. "202 
The question that remains unanswered in Craswell's projections 
for unilateral contract contexts is why the parties did not negotiate and 
bargain for protection of the Buyer's reliance. For example, when 
addressing the question of whether brokers should be protected, 
Craswell points to the increased willingness to "treat commissions 
offered to real estate brokers as unilateral contracts that become 
196. See Kostritsky, Precontractual Liability, supra note 11, at 359 ("[A]nalysts of 
precontractual reliance must still explain why the parties' self-interest does not result in 
expressly agreed to commitments and what, if anything, the Jaw should do when the parties 
fail to adopt express terms which would be hypothetically preferred."). 
197. Coffey E-mail (July 16, 1996), supra note 47. 
198. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 157, § 3.24. 
199. See REsTATEMENr(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 45 (1979). 
200. See Craswell, Efficient Reliance, supra note 9, at 527. 
201. Jd. 
202. Id. 
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irrevocable once the broker begins expending time and effort to find a 
buyer. "203 Craswell explains that without such protection, the brokers 
would have diminished "incentives to invest time and resources in 
finding a buyer."204 He therefore concludes that a law-supplied ruie of 
irrevocability would actually favor owners, because "owners may 
actually prefer to bind themselves in advance."205 Craswell's analysis 
and resolution of the question of law-supplied obligation seems 
incomplete because it lacks reference to the structural bar-Tiers that 
might inhibit private contract solutions to the problem of diminished 
incentives and pose costly obstacles to other private efforts to 
overcome such barriers. 
A close analysis of the contexts in which courts imply a term of 
irrevocability based on partial performance reveals the barriers that 
may exist to hinder the negotiation of an enforceable contract with 
consideration. For example, in the reward context the owner of the 
lost item does not know ex ante who the finder of the lost item will be 
and thus does not know with whom she should negotiate a contract. 
Hence, a problem of bounded rationality (uncertainty) exists and it 
would be costly to expend resources to identify the most likely finders. 
Similarly, the potential finder of the lost item does not know in 
advance that he will be the ultimate finder of the item so he does not 
even contemplate the need for any contractual protection. Moreover, 
the potential finder of the item may be disinclined to negotiate 
contractual protection for any interim steps talcen because he knows 
that the owner cares only about interim steps which prove successful 
and those interim steps are not readily discernible. Furthermore, the 
owner-offeree faces problems of bounded rationality; she does not 
know in advance which interim steps to bargain for because she does 
not lmow which steps will yield successful results. 
Despite the obstacles to negotiating contractual provisions, 
finder-offerees all face the problem of the opportunistic expropriation 
of their sunk costs; once the lost item is found-the owner could 
renege. Once the offeree takes almost all steps toward completion, the 
owner-offeror could yell: "I revoke." Yet, the offeree would think that 
contractual protection ex ante would be unnecessary because the 
offeror would hardly be expected to renege if the offeree actually 
delivered the lost item or achieved virtual completion of the task. 
203. ld. 
204. Jd. 
205. ld. at 528. 
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Sinlllar problems of bounded rationality might interfere with 
contractual protection in another context in which courts imply a term 
of irrevocability: namely in those contracts which take place over 
time. fu such cases, the question posed by section 45, and resolved 
affirmatively by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, is whether the 
law should imply a term of irrevocability based on a certain number of 
interim steps that constitute the beginning ofperformance.206 
Before the law should supply a term of irrevocability, it becomes 
important to determine why the offeror and offeree did not negotiate to 
make the offer irrevocable in return for a certain number of 
prespeci:fied interim steps and why the offeror and offeree did not take 
other steps to control the possible opportunistic exploitation of the 
relying party's sunk costs. 
An interesting example of a section 45 contract, which may help 
to illustrate the very real barriers that prevent express protection for a 
party's sunk costs, involves "a community pledge[] to pay part of a 
railroad's expenses if the railroad built a line to their community."207 
After commencement of construction, the community reneged.208 fu 
such a case, the corrnnu.Ility faced U<'1Certain.1y because it may have 
been unsure as to whether the railroad would actually be built and thus 
the community may have wanted to retain the flexibility of not 
committing any funds until completion of the railroad. The 
community could thereby insure against the prospect of payment for a 
half built (and useless) railroad. The railroad faced uncertainty too 
because it could not be certain that it could overcome all the hurdles to 
building a railroad. Because it might turn out to be too costly or 
difficult to build, the railroad might be reluctant to pledge ex ante to an 
unconditional commitment to completion. 
Given these multiple uncertainties faced by both parties, it will be 
difficult for the parties to negotiate an enforceable contract in which 
the community pledged payment in return for the railroad's promise to 
complete. However, even if such a contract were not attainable, one 
must then focus on subsidiary arrangements, short of an express fully-
contingent bilateral contract that might protect against opportunism. 
These arrangements could include fractionalizing performance into a 
series of divisible steps. Such fractionalization that might be the 
206. The beginning or tender of performance will serve to disable revocation of the 
offer. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 45 cmt. d (1979). 
207. Craswell, Efficient Reliance, supra note 9, at 527 (discussing Los Angeles 
Traction Co. v. Wilshire, 67 P. 1086, 1088 (Cal. 1902)). 
208. See id. 
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subject of an express bargain would be quite costly?09 It might be hard 
to foresee ex ante what interim steps the railroad could take that would 
be conjecturable as the consideration to keep the offer irrevocable. 
In addition, it might be costly to design and implement private 
schemes to guard against the opportunistic exploitation of sunk costs 
invested by the railroad. These could include costs incurred by 
monitoring to determine ex ante whether the offeror, who would be 
paying on completion, was trustworlhy. Efforts to learn enough about 
the offeror would be costly and would affect the amount that the 
offeree was willing to invest in sunk costs. The possibility of 
expropriation and the hazard risk would be priced out by the parties 
and could be costly. 
Finally, it would be costly to design and implement payment 
schemes to prevent the community offeror from acting 
opportunistically once the sunk costs were invested by the railroad. 
For example, variable payment schemes may work well to deter 
shirking in cases where the payment can be adjusted to reward the 
atilOUil.t of effort invested by an agent.210 In section 45 option contract 
cases, the party paying is the one who may be acting opportunistically. 
The vulnerable party who has invested sunk costs is not in a position 
to adjust the amount being paid to the offeror other than through 
reduced reliance. However, even the adjustment of effort and reliance 
that the railroad might make in response to the prospect of 
opportunism by the community would be a costly control mechanism. 
The railroad would not know in advance what the likelihood of the 
community's nonpayment might be; discerning such information 
could be costly. In such cases, given the assumption that parties prefer 
to maximize smplus, and given the cost of private contractual or other 
private control mechanism devices, the parties might prefer a 
generalized law-supplied rule of irrevocability that would "save them 
the costs of explicitly contracting over every change in the value of 
their respective positions."211 
Craswell prematurely suggests a law-supplied rule. This rule is 
without an account of all the structural barriers and possible private 
counter-strategies parties might use to surmount those barriers and 
achieve their joint goals. It is not enough to suggest reasons why 
209. See Discussions with Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law. 
210. See generally David E.M. Sappington, Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships, 5 
J. EcoN. PERSP. 45 (1991) (discussing incentives and frictions in principal-agent 
relationship). 
211. Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, supra note 9, at 692. 
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parties might benefit from a law-supplied rule without also 
determining whether other private solutions will work. Furthermore, if 
contractual solutions are not feasible, it is necessary to determine if a 
law-supplied rule can handle a perceived problem at a lesser cost than 
any other private mechanisms. 
B. Farber and Matheson on Precontractual Liability 
The absence of a comparative approach and the reliance on the 
perceived benefits of "both to the promisor and to society as a 
whole"212 to justify promissory estoppel and law-supplied 
precontractualliability can be seen in the Daniel A. Farber and John H. 
Matheson article.213 Farber and Matheson urge the continued and 
expanded use of promissory estoppel as a means of fostering "a high 
level of trust."214 They argue that courts should recognize promissory 
estoppel as an alternative to contracts with consideration because 
where, as in precontractual negotiation, "such relationships are highly 
interdependent, economic benefit is likely to be sought through 
informal m1derstandings that reinforce the relationship, rather than 
through discrete bargains."215 Willie Farber and Matheson are correct 
in arguing that parties "operate according to informal 
tmderstandings,"216 their article still fails to justify fully the proposition 
that law-supplied intervention in the form of a liability rule should 
recognize such informal understandings. 
Their article fails to engage in a full comparison of other 
altematives that parties could use to achieve trust. It is also not clear 
whether the net benefits that would be acrueved with a law-supplied 
rule would be greater than the net benefits that could be achieved by 
other private efforts to control precontractual opportunism. Thus, 
Farber and Matheson's article cannot fully justify the legal rule it 
proposes-enforcing "[a] promise ... when made in furtherance of an 
economic activity."217 
Vl SUBCONTRACTING REVISITED: SUBCONTRACTOR BIDDING AND 
THE HIDDEN QUESTION OF LAW-SUPPLIED TERMS 
The subcontractor bidding context presents still another arena in 
which courts must confront the issue of whether the law should imply 
212. Farber & Matheson, supra note 11, at 905. 
213. See generally id. 
214. !d. at 928. 
215. !d. at925-26. 
216. Kostritsky, Bargaining with Uncertainty, supra note 9, at 648. 
217. Farber & Matheson, supra note 11, at 930. 
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a term or corrimitment not expressly negotiated. Current legal 
approaches to the issue of protection for the general contractor's 
reliance in the subcontracting context are hampered by some of the 
deficiencies in the prior analyses.218 These deficiencies include a 
failure to address all of the behavioral assumptions affecting a bidding 
transaction, a failure to analyze underlying uncertainty issues, a failure 
to develop a comparative methodology to examine alternative law-
supplied rules beyond the current rule, a misplaced focus on 
bargaining power issues, a failure to focus on the central issue of how 
contractual hazards can be minimized so as to maximize surplus for 
the parties, and a failure to address the appropriateness of a law-
supplied rule. 
The failures of analysis help to explain the vacillation of courts 
deciding whether to imply, by law, a term of irrevocability for the 
subcontractor's offer once it has been relied on by the general 
contractor if none has been agreed to express!y.2!9 hlitially, in Jarnes 
Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Judge Learned Hand refused to imply a 
term of irrevocability.220 Later, Justice Traynor overturned settled law 
by implying a term of irrevocability in Drennan v. Star Paving Co.221 
The early Baird rule favored the subcontractor by denying all 
contractual protection to the general contractor who had relied on the 
subcontractor's bid. The current Drennan rule favors the general 
contractor by creating an option contract and binding the subcontractor 
to his offer while still allowing the general contractor the freedom to 
reject the offer ofthe subcontractor.222 
Efforts to grapple with the issue of the propriety of implying a 
term of in·evocability for the subcontractor's offer have been hampered 
by the failure to grasp the underlying uncertainty problems and other 
barriers which interfere with the negotiation of an express fully 
contingent contract in the subcontractor context. Initially, that neglect 
prompted Judge Hand to refuse to extend a.ny protection to the general 
contractor who had not bargained for full contract protection in the 
form of either an option contract or a fullblown bilateral contract.223 
218. See Kostritsky, Precontractual Liability, supra note II, at 399-400. 
219. Compare James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933) (rejecting 
law-supplied rule of irrevocability), with Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 
1958) (implying term of irrevocability for a reasonable period of time to give offeree-general 
contractor time to accept sub's offer). 
220. 64 F.2d at 346. 
221. 333P.2dat760-6l. 
222. See FARNSWOR1H, supra note 157, § 3.25. 
223. See Baird, 64 F.2d at 346. 
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Absent such a contract, Judge Hand reasoned that reliance by the 
general contractor should not be protected?24 
Judge Hand's approach neglects the reality of the second-best 
world ii1 which the subcontractor and contractor exist. He asswues 
that absent an express fully contingent contract or a fullblown express 
option, no protection should be offered for general contractors' 
precontractual reliance. fu this reality of a second-best world, 
however, the general contractor does not know ex ante whether he will 
get the overall bid. Thus, the most he could offer the subcontractor 
would be a conditional commitment. Under these circumstances a 
bilateral contract of the type envisioned by Judge Hand is an unlikely 
scenario. fu it, the subcontractor bargains for the use of the bid as an 
acceptance, with that acceptance functioning as a promise to use the 
subcontractor's services conditional only on being awarded the prime 
bid. The subcontractor may be unwilling to furnish such an 
unconditional promise of his own in return for only a conditional 
commitment from the general contractor. Here the value of 
commitment might not furnish the subcontractor with enough value to 
offset the subcontractor's having to stand ready to perform. The 
subcontractor might be Ut1willli1g to be bow1d unconditionall~y fr.uough 
an option contract to his offer of a service (at a specified price) in 
exchange for only a conditional commitment by the general contractor 
for si.rnilar reasons. 
Judge Hand's unwillingness to focus on problems of bounded 
rationality make him unable or unwilling to examine how a law-
supplied rule might "provide an incentive for each party to furnish the 
sunk costs necessary to get a deal started without overprotecting the 
general contractor."225 Furthermore, the parties face barriers to an 
explicitly reciprocal exchange of unconditional commitments. This 
examination would seek to determine whether a law-supplied rule of a 
specified content would produce greater net benefits than would obtain 
through the individualized negotiation of such conditional 
commitments or other private solutions. Judge Hand assumes that the 
absence of traditional bargained-for commitments should result in no 
contract liability and no recovery for the general contractor. 
The disinclination to face the realities of a second-best world 
affecting the parties and an unwillingness to examine law-supplied 
rules which might solve the problems of precontractual bargaining and 
provide incentives for parties to rely better than the current Drennan or 
224. See id. 
225. Kostritsky, Precontractual Liability, supra note 11, at 400. 
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Baird rules in subcontracting contexts is reflected in Professor Katz's 
analysis of the problem.226 He grapples with whether the law-supplied 
option of section 87(2i27 granting irrevocability to offers when the 
general contractor has relied on the subcontractor's bid is justifiable. 
Katz's analysis assumes that the Drennan rule of a law-supplied option 
will make sense only where the general contractor is without 
bargaining power and the subcontractor has all the bargaining power. 
fu such contexts, without the Drennan rule, "a rational contractor 
without any bargaining power would refuse to rely at all.'m8 fu other 
contexts, where the general contractor has the bargaining power, Katz 
suggests that the principle of free revocability should obtain because 
otheiWise subcontractors will delay making offers until the point 
"when the uncertainty over their ability to perform will be resolved."229 
In such contexts, the Drennan rule would be inefficient and should not 
be supplied.230 
As I have explained elsewhere,231 Katz's approach fails to 
cm1front the informational uncertainty problem.232 The problem for 
the general contractor is that bounded rationality limits his ability to 
offer an unconditional commitment to the subcontractor; the general 
contractor is not in a position ex ante to lmow whether it will be 
awarded the overall bid. Hence, it can only make predictions based on 
a probability distribution.233 Similarly, the subcontractor may itself be 
subject to intervening events between its offer and the award to the 
general contractor. Any significant added burden might make it 
difficult to stand by its bid. 
fu addition to the problems of bounded rationality which tend to 
preclude the ex ante exchange of unconditional commitments, there is 
the added problem of the general contractor's sunk costs in taking 
steps to finalize a deal wit~ the subcontractor. This makes the general 
contractor vulnerable to opportunistic behavior in the absence of any 
law-supplied commitment binding the subcontractor. 
226. See Katz, supra note I 0, at 1253-66. 
227. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 87(2) (1979) provides: 
An offer which the offeror should reasonably expect to induce action or 
forbearance of a substantial character on the part of the offeree before acceptance 
and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding as an option contract 
to the extent necessary to avoid injustice. 
228. Katz, supra note 10, at 1274. 
229. !d. at 1276. 
230. See id. at 1277. 
231. See Kostritsky, Precontractual Liability, supra note II, at 382. 
232. See id. at 399. 
233. See Discussion with Ronald J. Coffey, Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law. 
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Katz's analysis rejects a law-supplied Drennan rule in the case of 
the contractor having all the bargaining power. He concludes that the 
Drennan rule will cause "subcontractors [to] ... tend to avoid malcing 
offers until the last possible moment."234 He does not respond to the 
problem of uncertainty in the subcontracting context that would 
disable the general contractor from being able to issue an 
unconditional commitment. To deal with these realities, it is possible 
to imagine that the contractor and subcontractor might negotiate an 
exchange of conditional commitments. The projected exchange of 
such commitments might help to promote appropriate incentives to 
rely. Without a recognition of that aspect of bounded rationality, he 
does not examine whether the commitment of the subcontractor could 
be qualified in such a way as to maintain flexibility for the 
subcontractor, while at the same time providing protection for the 
general contractor's sunk costs in reliance on the subcontractor's bid. 
This solution could avoid the subcontractor delaying his offer too long. 
Because Katz does not examine the complete behavioral 
characteristics of the transaction, he does not try to posit alternative 
obligations wr.t.ich rr.J.~~t overcome some of the obstacles to an express 
exchange of unconditional commitments in the pre-award context. 
Nor does he attempt to analyze whether those alternative commitments 
might be better in the sense of generating greater net benefits than 
other private devices. That prevents Katz :fi.-om resolving the question 
lurking behind the adoption of the Drennan rule (and behind any law-
supplied rule implying a term)-nan1ely whether the court should 
intervene with a law-supplied rule of irrevocability or leave the matter 
of irrevocability completely to the parties. Because the analysis does 
not employ a comparative net benefit framework necessary in 
resolving all questions of law-supplied terms or law-supplied 
performance obligations, it leaves unresolved the fundamental 
question confronting courts: when, if ever, is it justifiable for the law 
to supply a term not expressly agreed to? 
Katz's treatment of the question of the appropriateness of a law-
supplied rule of irrevocability of subcontractor offers incorrectly 
focuses on the bargaining power issue. He indicates that where the 
subcontractor/offeror has the bargaining power, "a rational contractor 
[offeree] without any bargaining power would refuse to rely at all, 
since he cannot capture any of the il].cremental gains from early 
reliance, but he bears all of the risk."235 Katz indicates that the solution 
234. Katz, supra note I 0, at 1276. 
235. !d. at 1274. 
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to the problem _ of suboptimal investment and the danger of 
expropriation of the sunk cost investment lies in the subcontractor's 
offering of a "binding option in Week 3 . . . . The contractor will be 
willing to accept this offer, because it affords him a small profit in the 
event of performance and insures him against lost reliance in the event 
of nonperformance."236 The inference seems to be that because the 
subcontractor himself would offer such an option, then the law's 
supply of such an option by inference would be efficient because it is 
the solution that the parties themselves would have reached to promote 
optimal reliance. 
Katz's analysis of the subcontractor problem-with its focus on 
the bargaining power issue-does not explain what the law should do 
in the absence of an express agreement, nor provide an analytical 
structure for resolving that question. Katz cannot explain why the law 
should intervene because he has neither offered a framework for 
intervention that looks at obstacles to private solutions, nor compared 
such solt1tio11S to la·v/-supplied rules to detenrillle tl1c greatest net 
benefits. Should a legal decisionrnaker imply a term of irrevocability 
if the offeror himself fails to offer a binding option in Week 3 as Katz 
predicted he would? 
fu order to determine what a court should do in the absence of a 
privately negotiated solution, it is necessary to examine the key factors 
"responsible for differences"237 amongst transactions: bounded 
rationality, asset specificity and opportunism. Using such factors, a 
court could analyze the subcontractor/contractor context to determine 
whether the parties would in fact encounter "contractual 
difficulties."238 Williamson explains that when these factors coalesce, 
the parties themselves may be unable to reach a completely contingent 
contractual solution. Given those barriers, it would then be necessary 
to examine possible alternative solutions to the problem of 
opportunism and suboptimal investment. Only when the 
decisionrnaker is convinced that the law-supplied rule of irrevocability 
would achieve greater net benefits than private solutions would it be 
appropriate to intervene with a law-supplied rule. 
Thus, although Katz was correct in identifying the danger of the 
appropriability of investments and the possible negative effect on 
contractor investments absent contractual protection, he fails to justify 
the adoption of a law-supplied default rule in the form of section 87(2) 
236. Id.at 1274-75. 
237. WILLIAMSON, EcONOMIC INSTJTIJTIONS, supra note 18, at 52. 
238. See id. at 67. 
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of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Instead, he indicates that 
the parties themselves will proffer a private solution when it is efficient 
to do so. Katz therefore does not address the circumstances which 
might justify a law-supplied default rule of irrevocability in the 
absence of such private action. He does not invoke a framework that 
might be useful in explaining why the parties were not able to reach 
such a solution on their own and why a law-supplied rule should be 
adopted. "Could [it] move the parties closer to what they wanted ... 
and thereby increasing the gain from exchange, irrespective of who 
ends up with what portion of the gain?"239 
Katz's ability to resolve the issue of whether any law-supplied 
rule is justified is also hampered by an overly restricted view of how to 
judge the efficiency of investments in preliminary negotiations. Katz 
attempts to pinpoint efficient investment as one geared to the "moment 
at which it is optimal to begin investing."240 Efficient investments are 
based on a comparison of the investing party's costs of waiting (more 
expensive reliance if late) to the benefits of waiting (reduced 
uncertainty). He explains that "[a]s time passes, the incremental costs 
of delay will begin to exceed the incremental benefits of waiting. 
From the standpoint of a planner concerned with maximizing social 
wealth, this is the moment when the parties should be directed to 
rely."241 However, he ignores the fact that the decision by one party to 
invest will necessarily prompt danger of the opportunistic 
appropriation of the investment and thus of a suboptimal investment. 
This danger will require efforts to control the bad effects of 
opportunism. The central question then becomes which strategies, 
public or private, will best control the opportunism at the least cost, 
preserve the surplus, and thereby achieve the greatest net benefits. 
Therefore, Katz is misguided in thinking that it is possible to 
"maximiz[ e] social wealth"242 simply by comparing the costs and 
benefits of waiting without also considering the costs of opportunism 
and the costs of the efforts to control it. Only then can one really 
determine when the surplus from the trade will be maximized. Katz 
has removed consideration of the dissipation of the surplus through 
"costly subgoal pursuit,"243 which would follow a transaction specific 
investment. As a result, Katz does not consider the possible variety of 
responses to control expropriation hazards. Without a full 
239. Coffey E-mail (July 16, 1996), supra note 47. 
240. Katz, supra note 10, at 1268. 
241. Id. 
242. Id. 
243. WTI..LIAMSON, EcoNOMIC lNSTITlTTIONS, supra note 18, at 63. 
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consideration of those hazards, a detailed analysis of the costs and 
benefits of legal rules, and private responses both contractual and 
otherwise, one cannot determine if social wealth could be maximized. 
Katz is unwilling to examine alternatives to the Drennan rule, 
and he defends his bifurcated approach to the question of an implied 
term of irrevocability for the subcontractor's offer. He reserves the 
Drennan rule for cases where the subcontractors have the bargaining 
power. 244 His unwillingness depends on a misplaced focus on the 
relative bargaining power of the parties and on the split in surplus 
between subcontractor and contractor. That conceptual misfocus 
diverts Katz's attention from the central problem of maximizing 
surplus by minimizing and controlling contractual hazards. Without 
an inquiry into how surplus can be maximized by the control of 
opportunism at the least cost, Katz cannot determine whether a law-
supplied term would be appropriate. 
Katz's analysis of bargaining power leads him to posit that where 
the offeror has the bargaining power, it will make correct decisions 
because it will be able to capture the surplus?45 Where subcontractors 
have the bargaining power, Katz reasons that the subcontractor "can 
capture virtually all the gains from trade. "246 The general contractor 
''would refuse to rely at all, since he cannot capture any of the 
incremental gains from early reliance, but he bears all the risk."247 To 
counteract that diminished incentive for reliance, Katz speculates that 
subcontractors will "offer a binding option in week 3"248 which will 
encourage the contractor "to rely immediately. "249 While "the 
contractor breaks even,"250 the subcontractor's "expected profit is ... 
the total surplus from the transaction."251 
What is obscured in Katz's analysis of bargaining power issues is 
a comparative analytical structure for resolving issues of legal 
intervention. The central analytical concern should be the 
minimization of transaction costs so as to mitigate contractual hazards 
and maximize the surplus. In a sense, contract law remains indifferent 
as to how the surplus between the parties is split, though, of course, 
bargaining power advantages will cause one party to garner a greater 
part of the surplus. The important goal of the parties ex ante is to 
244. See Katz, supra note 10, at 1276. 
245. See id. at 1273, 1275. 
246. Id. at 1274. 
247. Id. 
248. Id. 
249. Id. at 1275. 
250. Id. 
251. Id. 
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maxnmze the surplus by minimizing the transaction costs of 
controlling contractual hazard. 
Once the paramount concern of reducing the costs of controlling 
contractual hazards is recognized, then the central question for the 
legal decisionmaker becomes whether a proposed legal rule will 
achieve the minimization of contractual hazard in precontractual 
negotiation with greater net benefits than those of other alternatives. 
The relative split of the surplus should be unimportant in crafting 
formation rules. 
Katz's misplaced concern with the respective shares of the 
surplus that a party can be expected to gamer stems from his 
incorporation of Oliver Hart's property model.252 In that model, Hart 
assumes that every contract will necessarily be incomplete and that 
ownership and control rights may affect incentives to make 
transaction-specific investments.253 The greater the possible control of 
the ex post surplus-which comes with ownership rights-the greater 
a party's willingness to make investment increases. Similarly, a party 
with a smaller fraction of the ex post surplus, due to lack of ownership, 
will have diminished incentive to invest. Thus, there is an arguable 
connection between the relative split of the surplus and the incentive to 
invest.254 
Hart illustrates that connection using an example in the 
automotive industry: the contract between GM and Fisher Body.255 If 
that contract is between two separate entities, then a question comes up 
about whether the contract should require additional deliveries from 
Fisher Body.Z56 For example, property rights will determine who has 
the right to make that determination by asking who is "the owner of 
the asset. "257 If Fisher Body owns the assets, it may refuse to consent 
to GM's request for additional deliveries.258 
In the context of these types of contracts, the parties may face the 
need for making transaction specific investments. Such investments 
may, in tum, make the investing party vulnerable to opportunistic 
expropriation.Z59 In Hart's model, one response to this danger is 
252. See OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTIJRE chs. 2, 3 
(1995). 
253. Seeid. at31. 
254. Thus, the "expected shares in tum detennine [the parties'] incentives to make 
specific investments in stage two." Katz, supra note 10, at 1279. 
255. See HART, supra note 252, at 29-33. 
256. Seeid.at31-32. 
257. Id. at 30. 
258. See id. at 31. 
259. See id. at 32. 
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integration; if o11e entity acquires another entity, then the "acquiring 
firm's incentive to make relationship specific investments increases 
since, given that it has more residual control rights, it will receive a 
greater fraction of the ex post srnplus created by such investments. "260 
Of course, integration itself may diminish the acquired party incentives 
to invest "since, given that it has fewer residual control rights, it will 
receive a smaller fraction of the incremental ex post srnplus created by 
its own investments."261 
Katz applies this property model of Oliver Hart to the 
precontractual bargaining context in a way that obscures important 
issues. First, Katz argues that in the context of precontractual 
bargaining, the person who has the bargaining power in precontractual 
negotiation can dictate the terms and capture the greatest portion of the 
srnplus. This person is equivalent to the property owner with residual 
control. Katz argues that the party with bargaining power, whether 
offeree or offeror, will make optimal decisions because of the ability to 
capture the srnplus. 262 Thus, if the subcontractor has the bargaining 
power, he will make correct choices "without any legal protection. "263 
Thus, there is no need to imply a law-supplied term of irrevocability if 
the subcontractor has bargaining power because he will make the 
correct decisions. As the party with bargaining power, Katz argues, 
the subcontractor will capture the "benefits of reliance, which she can 
accomplish if she has all the bargaining power; she will have 
appropriate incentive to weigh costs against benefits."264 
However, I would argue that the focus on the party with 
bargaining power with the attendant ability to capture srnplus is 
misplaced for several reasons. First, the attempt at identification of the 
party able to capture the greater fraction of the ex post srnplus and thus 
with greater bargaining power separate ,and apart from the investment 
of sunk costs seems fruitless. It is the investment of sunk costs by one 
party which necessarily gives the power of exappropriation of those 
sunk costs. That power to expropriate should be the focus rather than 
an abstract concern with bargaining power. The focus should be on 
which party has invested sunk costs and thereby stands to risk 
expropriation. If that becomes the focus, then it becomes anomalous 
to separate the discussion of bargaining power separate and apart from 
sunk costs. If the inquiry is refocused in that way, then the reliance on 
260. I d. at 33. 
261. Id. 
262. See Katz, supra note 10, at 1273-74. 
263. Id. at 1273 (emphasis added). 
264. Id. 
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the subcontractor's offer is a kind of sunk cost which subjects the 
general contractor to expropriation and the relevant question becomes 
how to mitigate the danger of opportunism and protect the general 
contractor. 
The bargaining power focus does not resolve what the law should 
do about a diminished incentive to invest. This diminished incentive 
may come from the other party having the power to expropriate sunk 
costs. Katz's analysis does recognize that if one does identify a party 
with bargaining power, then the party who is without bargaining 
power will experience a diminished incentive to invest. "[S]ince he 
cannot capture any of the incremental gains from early reliance . . . he 
bears all the risk. "265 
Although Katz supposes that in the case of subcontractor power, 
the subcontractor will overcome the offeror's reluctance to invest by 
offering an option. However, there is nothing in the bargaining model 
itself which suggests what the law should do in the absence of such an 
arrangement. In part, the focus on bargaining power in Katz is a 
surrogate for Hart's model based on who has residual control. That 
property based asset control focus of Hart's was never intended to 
resolve whether and in what circumstances the law should intervene. 
Because Hart assumed that "the only way to influence investment 
incentives is by allocating asset ownership,"266 he did not examine 
alternatives to integration and asset allocation. 
Focusing on bargaining power also leads Katz to analyze the 
issue of the irrevocability of a subcontractor's offer solely in terms of 
what the greater bargaining power of the offeree general contractor 
will allow the general to extract from the subcontractor. Under the 
Katz analysis, the greater bargaining power of the general will 
discourage early options by subcontractors, because contractors with 
bargaining power will reject the options and "turn around and offer her 
or one ofher competitors a last-minute, take-it-or-leave.:it offer to do 
the job at just over cost."267 It would be a mistake to imply 
irrevocability for subcontractor bids where they lack bargaining power 
because it would delay offers. That possibility will cause 
subcontractors to delay offers "until the last possible moment."268 To 
avoid the risk and possibility of overly long delays in subcontractors 
making offers, Katz would deny the possibility of protecting general 
contractors. 
265. !d. at 1274. 
266. HART, supra note 252, at 85. 
267. Katz, supra note I 0, 1276. 
268. !d. 
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The focus on bargaining power diverts Katz from analyzing what 
impediments prevented a fully contingent contract exchanging 
unconditional commitments, and from whether the subcontractor 
could offer the general contractor a flexible commitment in return for a 
conditional commitment from the general contractor which could 
respond to those impediments and protect each party without offering 
too much protection to either party. 
Katz's model neither focuses on what the problems each party 
faces in preliminary negotiation are, nor tries to propose solutions, 
whether law-supplied or private, which might solve those problems. 
This leads Katz to suggest no protection for general contractors with 
bargaining power because it will offer "too much protection."269 The 
question should be how can each party be encouraged to invest in the 
relationship by the minimization of opportunism, and if so, how can 
such mitigation be achieved with the greatest net benefits? 
A misplaced focus on bargaining power also leads Katz to 
assume that the party with the bargaining power with the attendant 
ability to "capture virtually all gains from trade"270 will lead that party 
to make correct decisions. For example, if the subcontractor has the 
bargaining power, Katz thinks that "[ s ]he will want to bind herself just 
in time for optimal reliance."271 
Here I think the difficulty lies in Katz's assumption that one can 
identify a party with the ability to capture the greater portion of the 
surplus apart from the issue of identifying the investment of sunk 
costs. Katz also mistakenly argues that identifying such party will lead 
to correct decisions by the party with such bargaining power. 272 In 
fact, Hart makes a more limited claim for parties who have residual 
control rights.273 Such control will prompt the party with control to 
make more transaction specific investments, secure in the knowledge 
that the "threat of expropriation"274 of such investment is diminished. 
In the context of subcontracting, this might suggest that if the party 
that initially invests the sunk costs-the general contractor-remains 
subject to expropriation by the other party, then it is unlikely such 
party will make optimal decisions even if you argue that such party has 
greater initial bargaining power. 
269. Id. 
270. Id. at 1274. 
271. Id. at 1275. 
272. Id. at 1273. 
273. HART, supra note 252, at 85. 
274. I d. at 32. 
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Katz has used the Hart idea of residual control and imported it 
into the context of precontractual negotiation and identified the party 
·with bargaining power as the surrogate for the one with residual 
ownership. Aside from the difficulty of separating bargaining power 
from the investment of sunk costs, the model is also difficult to import 
into the precontractual context because the model itself assumes that 
the contract is necessarily incomplete. Hart does not examine whether 
there are contractual devices, other private strategies or law-supplied 
rules which will ameliorate the danger of expropriation. Hart assumes 
"the only way to influence investment incentives is by allocating asset 
ownership."275 Hence, the usefulness in the context of a debate about 
whether the law should intervene with an implied term seems 
questionable. Thus, although there is some dissatisfaction with the 
one-sided protection for the general contractor (which has led some 
commentators and courts to suggest that the Drennan rule should 
perhaps be curtailed),276 that dissatisfaction with the Drennan rule of 
irrevocability or with the opposite early rule of revocability will not be 
resolved without the development of a new structure for resolving the 
imnortant issue of a law-sunnlied tenn. That stmcnm~ will r~onin~ th~ 
.l. ---~-.1---- -- ------- ~----- ----------- ··--- ---~---- ----
recognition of the bounded rationality, sunk costs, and opportunism 
endemic to subcontractor settings. That structure also requires the 
development of a comparative analysis to determine how the hazards 
of opportunism can be minimized ex ante, given the presence of 
bounded rationality and sunk costs, so as to maximize surplus. 
Without such an analysis, courts and commentators will continue to 
vacillate on the issue of the protection of general contractors without a 
means of rationally resolving the issue. 
Vll. CONCLUSION 
The question of when the law should imply terms or 
commitments not expressly agreed to by the parties is a fundamental 
one but its resolution remains unrealized. Scholars trying to resolve 
the question have made a number of analytical errors which have 
hampered a clear or fruitful analysis. They have failed to confront all 
of the relevant behavioral assumptions needed to resolve legal 
intervention questions. They have obscured the nature oflaw-supplied 
interventions. Their justification sometimes confuses instances in 
which the law refuses to add terms beyond those agreed to expressly 
275. Id. at 85. 
276. See Pavel Enters. v. A.S. Johnson Co., 674 A.2d 521, 523 (Md. 1996) (fmding 
that detrimental reliance was "not applicable to the facts of this case''). 
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with instances in which the law intervenes. This subjects those 
fundamentally different situations to a unified analysis and obscures 
the nature of a framework needed to justify legal intervention. 
The most fundamental error in scholarship attempting to resolve 
law-supplied default rules is the consistent failure to incorporate a 
comparative net benefit comparative methodology for resolving when 
and how the law should intervene. Recognition of the importance of 
that comparative element of analysis furnishes the basis for a critique 
of the current penalty default rule developed by Professors Ayres and 
Gertner. That critique posits that the penalty default approach still 
lacks a framework for determining when it is appropriate to intervene 
with law-supplied rules. Moreover, the penalty default approach 
remains problematic because it assumes rather than justifies, 
intervention as a response to strategic behavior. The absence of a 
comparative net benefit :fra..uework has also ha..upered the 
commentators' approaches to resolving the fundamental question of 
whether a law-supplied rule is appropriate in the precontractual and 
subcontractor bidding contexts. 
